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Thomas Jefferson's dismay over the failed impeachment of
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805 led him later to
complain that "impeachment is not even a scarecrow."1 Subse-
quent events have proven Jefferson wrong. Although the full
panoply of the impeachment process has been used rarely, its
existence has given Congress an impressively big stick to wield in
persuading miscreant judges to leave the bench.2 Since Jefferson's
time, our experience has suggested two important conclusions about
judicial discipline and removal. The first is that investigations,
threats of investigations, and threats of impeachment can be very
powerful tools in inducing judges to resign from office voluntarily.
The second is that these tools have a great potential for misuse.
Judicial independence is a core value supported by the constitu-
tional structure of the federal judiciary. The appointment process,
salary protection, and removal mechanism are all means to ensure
that federal judges be independent and impartial in their decision-
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1 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859).
2 See Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment As the
Exclusive Removal Mechanismfor Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1209, 1209 (1991)
(noting comment by British observerJames Bryce that the impeachment process was
like "a hundred-ton gun").
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making. On the other hand, judicial independence was probably
not intended to trump judicial accountability for misbehavior.
3
Just as we value holding judges accountable for behavior deviating
from high standards of probity in order to insure, among other
things, public confidence in the judiciary, the protection of judicial
independence is intended to support impartial decision-making for
the benefit of litigants and society, not for the benefit of individual
judges.4 The balancing of independence and accountability has
never been easy; history shows that privileging one above the other
can carry serious costs.5  For Jefferson, the costs of judicial
independence overwhelmed its benefits after the defeated Federal-
ists retreated into the judiciary at the end ofJohn Adams's presiden-
cy. The vehemence of his rejection of judicial independence, and
his proposed means to control judges, highlight just how fragile a
concept independence can be in the face of partisan differences:
Before the canker is become inveterate, before its venom has
reached so much of the body politic as to get beyond control,
remedy should be applied. Let the future appointments ofjudges
be for four or six years, and renewable by the President and
Senate. This will bring their conduct, at regular periods, under
revision and probation, and may keep them in equipoise between
the general and special governments.... That there should be
public functionaries independent of the nation, whatever may be
their demerit, is a solecism in a republic, of the first order of
absurdity and inconsistency.
6
3 In addition to disagreement over the relative weights to be given independence
and accountability, commentators also disagree about what behavior judges can be
held accountable for. Some people believe that judicial accountability extends only
to misbehavior in office, whereas others feel that it extends to both judicial and
nonjudicial malfeasance. See, e.g., Wrisley Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal
Judiciaty, 26 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 (1913) ("[T]he... offense need not necessarily
be committed under color of office.").
4 But see RUSSELL WHEELERJUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TOJUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 12 (1988) (arguing that the framers of the Constitution, taking human
nature into account, intendedjudicial independence to foster the desire ofjudges as
individuals to achieve fame).
5 The writing onjudicial discipline and removal is voluminous. See, e.g., Federal
Judicial History Office, Federal Judicial Ctr., The History ofJudicial Discipline and
Removal in America: A Preliminary Working Bibliography (June 1992) (prepared for
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal); KEVIN R. CORR &
LARRY BERKSON, LrrERATURE ON JUDICIAL REMOVAL (1992); THOMAS C. KINGSLEY,
THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN PRECEDENCE [SIC], HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENT AND
SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY (1974).
6 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 256.
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The question we are left with is the same one that attends most
constitutional issues: What costs are we willing to incur as we weigh
one value against another?7
In an impeachment proceeding, the House brings articles of
impeachment (the equivalent of indictment) and, upon delivery of
impeachment articles, the Senate tries the accused judge.8 Upon
conviction by two-thirds of the Senate, the judge is removed from
office, and may also be barred from holding other federal office in
the future.9 No other punishment by the Senate is constitutionally
permissible.1" In fact, it might come as a surprise to many that
conviction of a felony does not automatically result in forfeiture of
office and disbarment for federal judges. The Constitution vests
sole impeachment power in the Congress, 1 and theories of other
constitutional means of removal have not prevailed to date. 2
' For an illuminating discussion of this crucial point, see RUSSELL R. WHEELER &
A. LEO LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES 59-60
(1979). Wheeler and Levin note that
[i]t is important to take care to distinguish reasoned appeal to the need to
preserve judicial independence from less justifiable references to this
principle. "Judicial Independence" is not a talismanic phrase that justifies
a veto of any and all proposals for new disciplinary mechanisms. Sometimes
it appears to be no more than an automatic reflex: the assertion of the
need for such independence seems at times to be used as a tactical ploy to
hide other, less reasonable objections to a particular proposal. Cheapening
the argument in this way is unfortunate, for it clouds the issue and makes
it more difficult for sponsors of proposals to appreciate insidious threats to
such independence that may in fact exist.
Id. at 73-74.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 5 (vesting the "sole Power of Impeachment" in the
House of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (granting the Senate the "sole Power
to try all Impeachments"). For a discussion of the impeachment mechanism, see
ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACH-
MENT TRIALS 21-22 (1992).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI. 6-7.
o See id. ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust or Profit under the United States .... ").
" Under Article II, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, "all civil Officers of the
United States... shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Id. art. II, § 4.
Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 rests the "sole Power of Impeachment" in the House of
Representatives, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 gives the Senate
"the sole Power to try all Impeachments." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
For a discussion of whether these clauses represent the sole constitutional means
for removing federaljudges (with the exception ofjudges appointed under Article I),
see Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional
Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213-23 (1993).
" Although the Constitution does place the impeachment power with Congress,
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The impeachment process, including trial by the Senate, has
historically been cumbersome and often protracted. Over the years
many members of Congress have found the process to be excessively
time consuming and deleterious to the handling of more pressing
affairs.1 3 Indeed, Congress has impeached only thirteen judges
since 1789, and only seven were eventually removed from the
bench.14 Since the 1930s, the impeachment mechanism has fallen
into disuse as Congress increasingly relies on Justice Department
a number of scholars argue that the Constitution does not preclude removal by other
means. Prominent among these scholars was Burke Shartel, who wrote a series of
articles in the 1930s recommending alternate means of removal under the "good
behavior" clause of Article III; more recently the foremost proponent of this view is
Raoul Berger. See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointmen Supervision, and
Removal--Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870, 898 (1930);
Burke Shartel, Retirement and Removal of Judges, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 134
(1936); see also Raoul Berger, Impeachment ofJudges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79
YALE L.J. 1475 (1970).
1 For a brief discussion of some of the congressional reactions to impeachments
over the last 200 years, see Robert W. Kastenmeier & MichaelJ. Remington,Judicial
Discipline: A Legislative Perspective, 76 KY. L.J. 763, 765 (1988), and Stephen B.
Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal Judges, 76
KY. L.J. 643, 64448 (1988).
14 The thirteen are: John Pickering (1804) (convicted and removed); Samuel
Chase (1805) (acquitted); James H. Peck (1830) (acquitted); West H. Humphreys
(1862) (convicted and removed); Mark H. Delahay (1872) (resigned after impeach-
ment but before completion of process); Charles H. Swayne (1905) (acquitted);
Robert W. Archbald (1913) (convicted and removed); George W. English (1925)
(resigned after impeachment but before completion ofprocess); Harold Louderback
(1932) (acquitted); Halsted L. Ritter (1936) (convicted and removed); Harry Claiborne
(1986) (convicted and removed); Alcee L. Hastings (1989) (convicted and removed);
and Walter L. Nixon,Jr. (1989) (convicted and removed). See Grimes, supra note 2,
at 1214 n.32.
For a catalog of impeachment proceedings not leading to trial, see id. at 1214
n.32; JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 219-59 (1962) (providing
data on position, charges, and disposition of cases against federal judges whose
official conduct has been subject to judicial inquiry); 6 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON'S
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 202
(1935) [hereinafter CANNON'S PRECEDENTS] (describing impeachment proceedings
during 1908-31 that did not result in trial); 3 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER'S
PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 14, §§ 16-17
(1979) [hereinafter DESCHLE!'S PRECEDENTS] (describing impeachment proceedings
againstJudges English and Louderback); Grimes supra note 2, at 1214 n.32; 3 ASHER
C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES chs. 71-74, 77-79 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS' PRECEDENTS] (describing
impeachments and trials ofJudges Pickering, Chase, Peck, Humphreys, and Swayne,
as well as impeachment proceedings not resulting in trial between 1796 and 1895);
EMILY F. VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SERVICE, 1789 TO 1992 app. (1993).
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prosecutions or informal pressure from other sources to induce
misbehaving judges to resign voluntarily, without resort to impeach-
ment and trial.15 Congress has regularly revisited the problem of
judicial discipline and removal, but until recently the inherent
problem with relying on noncongressional means of ridding the
bench of problem judges has been masked by the fact that many
judges about whom serious allegations have been made have chosen
voluntary resignation. In 1973, for the first time in American
history, a sitting federal judge was actually convicted of a crime and
sentenced to prison.1 6 He resigned from the bench once all his
appeals were exhausted and prison became inevitable.
17
Recently, however, there has been significant exposure of the
flaw in relinquishing the removal of federal judges to the criminal
justice system: except for voluntary resignation, death, or impeach-
ment, there is no constitutional means to forcibly remove a federal
judge from the bench.18 Since 1980, the Department of Justice
sought and obtained indictments against five sitting U.S. judges on
charges ranging from income tax evasion to bribery. 19 None of
the five judges chose to resign. Indeed, Judge Harry Claiborne
drew his salary for two years while in jail, and he vowed to return to
his seat on the U.S. District Court for Nevada before Congress
finally removed him through the impeachment process in 1986.20
15 See Grimes, supra note 2, at 1216. Until recently, this phenomenon seems to
have been masked by the fact that manyjudges against whom serious allegations have
been leveled have chosen voluntary resignation over the impeachment process.
16 A former Illinois governorJudge Otto KernerJr., of the U.S. Court ofAppeals
for the Seventh Circuit, was prosecuted for acts committed before he was appointed
to the bench. Although he did not resign until his appeals were exhausted, he
stopped hearing cases at the time he was indicted. See infra notes 266-69 and
accompanying text.17 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
18 Seesupra notes 11-12;seealso infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the refusal of Judge Herbert Fogel to resign from the bench in the face of
investigations by the Justice Department).
19 The judges were Robert Agnilar (D. Cal.), Harry Claiborne (D. Nev.), Robert
Collins (D. La.), Alcee Hastings (D. Fla.), and Walter Nixon (D. Miss.). Judges Robert
Agnilar, Robert Collins, Harry Claiborne, and Walter Nixon were convicted, and
Judge Alcee Hastings was acquitted. Congress has subsequently impeached,
convicted, and removed three of these judges, including Alcee Hastings (who has
since been elected to Congress). Robert Collins resigned in August of 1993, after his
appeals were exhausted and impeachment was imminent. See United States v. Collins,
972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993); see also Joan
Biskupic, Supreme Court Order Opens Wayfor Possible Impeachment ofJudge, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 1993, at A4 (discussing Collins's case and history of impeachments).
20 See Gerald Stern, What Claiborne Did, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1986, at A27.
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Similarly, Judge Robert Collins, who has been in prison since 1991,
continued to draw his annual salary until his resignation in August
of 1993.21 The last time Congress actually impeached a federal
judge prior to the 1980s was in 1936, when Judge Halsted Ritter of
Florida was removed. 22 Congress has seen its hand forced for the
first time in fifty years.
Overwhelmed by these recent rapid-fire prosecutions and
impeachment proceedings against federal judges-actions that
contemporary commentators perceive as the result of an unprece-
dented surge in judicial misconduct-Congress sought guidance on
how to deal with the potential increase in investigations and
removals of federal judges that these prosecutions might bring.
23
In point of fact, however, very little is known about how these
recent prosecutions fit into the overall history of the federal
judiciary. There is much anecdote and tradition about the nature
of the federal judiciary and the people who have served as its
judges, but what reliable information exists is scattered among many
different sources. The purpose of this study is to explore some of
those sources and cast light on the historical behavior of federal
judges. I have drawn my conclusions from both aggregated
behavior of federal judges as well as from the actions and claims of
individual judges. I have given particular attention to why federal
judges have left the bench. Where the cause is not clear, the study
indicates the reasons that judges have offered for their departures,
although at times these may have been misleading or incomplete.
This information will help clarify whether the recent prosecutions
are in fact a symptom of alarming changes in judicial behavior.
This study focuses on the 190 judges who, over the last 200
years, resigned from the bench for stated reasons other than age or
health.24 Because the number of judges who were actually im-
21 See Biskupic, supra note 19, at A4; John McQuaid, Collins Resigns Federal
Judgeship, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 7, 1993, at BI.
22 See Biskupic, supra note 19, at A4.
23 See National Commission on judicial Discipline and Removal Act, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 409, 104 Stat. 5124, 5124 (1990) (establishing a commission to study the
issues involved in the discipline and removal of an Article III judge); Harry T.
Edwards, Regulatingjudicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior"for FederalJudges,
87 MICH. L. Rv. 765, 765 (1989); MaryJacoby, Brooks Awaits O.K As House Braces for
First Impeachment Proceedings Since Hastings, ROLL CALLJune 28, 1992; Russell Ryan,
Better Ways to Dump Bum Judges?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1990, at D3.
24 Much of the biographical information included in this study is distilled from
data collected by the FederalJudicial History Office (FJHO) on all Article Iijudges
who could be identified as resigning from office or retiring between 1869 (when
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peached by Congress is quite small,25 a broader look at all Article
III judges who have left the bench, and the reasons why they have
done so, may yield more reliable information about judicial
behavior. Some attention is also paid to judges who resigned or
retired for reasons of age or health before 1919, when "retirement
from regular active service" was first offered as an option to Article
III judges. This study also addresses the relationship between
resignation, malfeasance, and threats of different kinds of punish-
ment. The history of other aspects of judicial tenure that may be
salient to the question of how to ensure the high quality and
integrity of the federal judiciary, such as the effects of changes in
provisions for retirement and disability, and the historical factors
surrounding resignations ofjudges for employment-related reasons
are considered also.
Part I of this study begins with a summary of the two centuries
of growth of the federal Article III judiciary, from the nineteen
judgeships created by the Judiciary Act of 178926 to the 829 judge-
ships that were authorized by Congress by the close of this study.
This Part offers a picture of the changing contours of the judiciary
as an institution and provides a context for evaluating the changing
numbers of judicial resignations. An overview of the numbers of
judicial resignations for the last two centuries includes an analysis
of these numbers and how they have changed over time. It briefly
explores the major categories of resignations and examines in some
detail the underlying pattern of judges resigning from office to
pursue other employment. This overview sets the stage for Part II,
which explores the most salient issues raised by these numbers.
Part II explores the relationship between judicial accountability
and judicial independence by taking a close look at not only the
most well known incidents of alleged judicial misbehavior leading
to congressional investigations, but also at the less well known in-
stances ofJustice Department investigations and local prosecutions.
retirement became an option) and 1919 (when retiring "from regular active service"
became an option). As of this writing, there is no comprehensive, accurate listing of
judges who retired, "retired from the office," took disability retirement, or were
"involuntarily" certified as disabled that would allow distinguishing between these
categories. Thus, it is not possible at this time to assess change over time in either
the numbers of judges entering these categories or their reasons for doing so.
Therefore, treatment of retired judges, of whatever stripe, will be limited to an
impressionistic discussion.
25 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
26 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-3, 1 Stat. 73.
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Part II also discusses the effects on judicial resignation of threats to
use all of these mechanisms. The implications of these approaches
on judicial accountability and judicial independence and their
influence on judicial behavior are suggested. Finally, Part III
summarizes the legislative provisions for retirement and disability
and considers their impact on the problem of the incompetent
judge.
I. OVERVIEW
A. The Growth of the Federal Judiciary
The size of the American judiciary has changed dramatically
over the past 200 years in response to three major factors:
(1) geographical and population growth, (2) commercial growth, and
(3) changes in federal jurisdiction. As the country expanded
westward and territories were organized and became states,
Congress added corresponding district courts to accommodate the
needs of these new states.2 7  In addition, as population grew
through acquisition of territory, natural increase, and immigration,
consequent pressures on the federal courts demanded an expanded
judiciary.2 8 Finally, beginning in earnest after the Civil War,
congressional legislation as well as judicial activism in such areas as
administration of civil-rights remedies have placed significant
burdens on the federal bench.29 Congress and the President have
27 
See RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 14 (1989) (recounting the history of the growth of the judicial
system resulting from the growth of the country).
28 See id.
29 William M. Wiecek has identified four ways in which the federal courts'jurisdic-
tion, and thus workload, increased in the years following the Civil War. See William
M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 237 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
1988). These were: (1) newly conferred removal powers; (2) the creation of the
Court of Claims to handle cases against the federal government; (3) the passage of
a bankruptcy act that shifted much of the insolvency-related business of state courts
to federal courts; and (4) the conferral of general federal question jurisdiction on the
lower federal courts. See id.; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, pt. 3, 18 Stat. 470,
470 (creating federal question jurisdiction). Prohibition was responsible for an
enormous increase in judicial workload in the 1920s and 1930s, an increase that at
least some judges seemed to relish. See e.g., 17 Brooklyn Cafes Closed in a Day, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1924, at I (reporting Judge Campbell's order closing the largest
number of saloons in Brooklyn in one day since Prohibition went into effect); 32 Dy
Padlocks in a Day Set Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1924, at 28 (reporting a record set
by Judge Edwin Garvin for the number of "padlock injunctions" issued in one day,
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responded with many minor and several major expansions of the
judicial work force in this century.
In 1789, the first Congress created nineteen Article III judge-
ships.30 Six men sat on the Supreme Court and rode circuit as trial
and appellate judges; Congress allotted the remaining thirteen
judgeships to district courts, one for each state, plus one each for
the districts of Maine and Kentucky, then parts of Massachusetts
and Virginia respectively.31  Over the next seventy years the
number of Supreme Court Justices grew to nine, where, with the
exception of five years in the 1860s, it has remained ever since.
3 2
and indicating that a total of 750 were anticipated for the year). The Fourteenth
Amendment brought a "steady torrent" of cases before the Supreme Court following
upon the heels of the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In
addition, legislation regulating "Big Business" and policing social welfare began in
earnest after the turn of the century. Frankfurter and Landis note that "[w]ith
differences of emphasis and detail, the path of regulation entered upon by
[Theodore] Roosevelt has persisted to this day, and has been trodden by every
succeeding President." FELIX FRANKFURTER &JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 105 (1927). It is not
hard to guess what they might have said about the quantity of regulatory legislation
ado pted in the ensuing 65 years.
50 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74.
31 The number of judgeships cited in this Section and used as the basis for
statistical calculations throughout are from an internal report by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistics Division, on the number ofauthorizedjudgeships
from 1789-1990. See Statistics Div., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, History
of the Authorization of FederalJudgeships Including Procedures and Standards Used
in ConductingJudgeship Surveys (1991) [hereinafter AOUSC Report]. These num-
bers are for Article IIIjudgeships and include the Supreme Court, the circuit courts
of appeals (including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, established
in 1982), the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (1863-1935), the Court of
Customs and PatentAppeals (1958-1981), the Court of Claims (1855-1981), and the
Court of International Trade (1956-1990). Another source for similar, although not
equivalent, information is RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM tbl. B.3, at 353-57 (1985). From 1882 on, it is possible to compile the
number of judges in active service from listings in each volume of the Federal
Reporters, which West began publishing in 1882. Although it would have been
preferable to use the number ofjudges rather thanjudgeships in this report, to date
there has been no accurate compilation of the number ofjudges sitting per year for
the years prior to 1882. Thus, in order to maintain consistency in statistical analysis,
judgeships were used throughout.
2 Congress increased the size of the Supreme Court for the first time in 1807
with the addition of an Associate Justice, creating a seven-person court. See Act of
Feb. 24, 1807, ch.16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421. In 1837, the number of Justices was
increased from seven to nine. See Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 4, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176.
In 1863, Congress brought the number ofJustices to 10. See Act of March 3, 1863,
ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794. The death of Judge Catron in 1865 reduced the
number ofjudges to nine; Congress then passed the Act ofJuly 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14
Stat. 209, denying the President any further appointments to the court until after the
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During the same period, the growth of the country to thirty-three
states brought a concomitant increase in the number of district
court judgeships to a total, in 1860, of forty-three.'3 In 1855,
Congress created the first circuit judgeship to deal with the large
number of land disputes in California.34 By 1860, on the eve of
the Civil War, a total of fifty-five U.S. judgeships provided for "good
behavior" tenure.3 5 By 1900, the number of Article III judgeships
had reached 113.36 Thus, over the course of 100 years, the
judiciary had grown by nearly 500%. After 1900, the judiciary
continued to grow at an exponential rate, doubling in size over the
next three decades.3 7 By 1970, it had doubled again, to 521
judgeships. During the 1980s, Congress added 157 new judgeships
(see Figure 1). In 1990, the number of Article IIIjudgeships stood
at 829, double the number of only twenty-five years before.
38
next vacancy, which occurred when Justice Wayne died in July of 1867. See id. The
court was finally set at its current size by the Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, §1, 16 Stat.
44.
33 See AOUSC Report, supra note 31, tbl. 7.
34 See WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 27, at 14.
3- See AOUSC Report, supra note 31, tbl. 7.
36 See id.
-7 Congress passed omnibus judgeship bills in 1922, 1935, and 1938. See Act of
Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 1, 42 Stat. 837, 837-38 (adding 24 district judgeships); Act
of Aug. 19, 1935, ch. 558, § 1, 49 Stat. 659, 659 (authorizing 14 additional
judgeships); Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 290, § 1, 52 Stat. 584, 584-85 (adding four
circuit judgeships and 12 district judgeships).
38 See AOUSC Report, supra note 31, tbl. 7.
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In recent years, both judges and scholars have expressed
concern about the effects the growth of the judiciary may have on
the appeal of the job and the behavior of judges.39 For instance,
one theory holds that the larger the size of the judiciary, the lower
the prestige of the job, and thus the lower the quality of people
willing to serve.40 However, this concern appears to be, if not
s9 See e.g.,Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring FederalJurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve
the FederalJudicial System, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 761,762-67 (1989) (arguing that growth
of federal caseload threatens the quality of federaljudges, quality of their work, and
the overall functioning of federal court system); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal
Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the
Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761, 764 (1983) (expressing concern about
reduction in quality of federal appellate rulings due to increasing number of appeals).40 See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMIrEE 6-8 (1990); GORDON BERMANT ET AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM
ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERALJUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 30-
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belied by the history of judicial resignations,41 at least in need of
qualification in deference to other factors that make the equation
more complex. Similarly, the theory that holds that an increase in
the size of the judiciary will result in a decrease in collegiality and
peer pressure, leading to more questionable behavior on the part of
judges, requires close empirical study.
42
B. Changes in Judicial Tenure
Whether or not the size of the judiciary can be said to affect the
nature of judicial tenure-specifically, the appeal and quality of the
office-it clearly must affect any assessment of whether and how
tenure itself-the length of time in office and the reasons for leaving-
has changed over time. Because the judiciary has historically
numbered relatively few people, it is not surprising that the absolute
number leaving office has been correspondingly small. Resignations
occur infrequently (averaging only slightly more than one per year
until the 1970s), so that discovering a pattern or even discerning
change over time is difficult. But if numbers of resignations are
considered as a percentage of the total Article III judiciary at a
given point in time, some patterns begin to emerge.
31 (1993). Richard Posner noted in 1985 that "an increase in the number ofjudges
could reduce the prestige of the individual judge, and prestige is an important form
of nonpecuniary compensation for federal judges. It is unlikely, however, that any
substantial reduction in prestige has yet occurred." POSNER, supra note 31, at 36.
41 As is discussed in the next Section, the highest percentage of resignations in
U.S. history occurred during the decade when our judiciary was smallest. See infra
part I.B.1. Excluding the resignations that occurred during the secession of the South
before the Civil War, the next highest percentage of resignations occurred during the
1820s and 1910s, decades when the judiciary was only a- fraction of its current size.
See infra part I.B.1. This suggests that even if a small judiciary is desirable, it is not
necessarily correlated with the promotion of "prestige."
Nonetheless, theories related tojudicial size deserve closer scrutiny, though they
are beyond the scope of this study. For example, does the fact that the judiciary is
so big result in more dissatisfaction with the office, measured by resignations to take
otherjobs? Does a higher proportion of potential candidates for judgeships decline
nomination now than in the past? If so, is it because the size of the federal judiciary
diminishes its "elite" status? Does greater size mean more investigations into
allegations of judicial misbehavior? Such questions must be addressed with more
than impressionistic or anecdotal studies.42 See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Informal Methods ofJudicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 243, 305-06 (1993).
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1. Judicial Resignations As a Percentage of the
Total Judiciary: Change over Time43
Between 1789 and 1992, 2627 men and women served as federal
judges.44 Of those, 190 left the bench citing reasons other than
health or age. Thus, over the course of U.S. history, only 7% of all
Article MI judges have resigned from the bench for reasons other
than health or age. With the exception of this one group, the
resignation rates per decade were determined by calculating the
average number of judgeships per decade (not per year), and
dividing that number into the total number of resignations for the
entire decade. 45 These figures do not include senior judges.
Examined by decade, the percentage ofjudges leaving the bench has
fluctuated over the years, but has declined since 1910 as the size of
the judiciary has increased.
43 The Appendix to this Article contains a list of all federal judges categorized by
decade of tenure (table 1) and reason for termination (table 2). See infra app., tbl. 1.
All observations made within this Part rely on these tables.
44 This number was calculated by counting the number of appointments per
President. See Index by Appointing President, in THE BICENTENNIAL COMM. OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES 563-65
(1983) (providing information on U.S. Presidents from Washington through Carter);
AOUSC Report, supra note 31, app. (providing information for Presidents Reagan
and Bush).
45 When referring to the average size of the judiciary in a decade, the reference
is to the average judgeships, and not to the total number of individual judges who
served over the course of the decade. See supra note 31 (explaining why judgeships
were used instead ofjudges). As the goal in creating the resignation rates was to
assess change over time, it was thought that, applied consistently, the method
employed would yield numbers allowing comparison by decade. These rates will not,
however, compare with rates based on a ratio of numbers of resignations to numbers
ofjudges sitting in any given year.
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FIGURE 2
Percentage ofJudges Resigning for Reasons
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The highest departure rate for reasons other than health or age
(32%) occurred during the decade when the judiciary was at its
smallest: 1789-1799. The average number of judgeships per year
during this decade was twenty-two. In all, ten judges resigned
during those years. Three judges left citing reasons of health or
age, three were elected or appointed to other offices, and four left
to resume private practice (one explicitly citing inadequate salary as
his reason for doing so).46 Four of the ten resignations came from
Supreme CourtJustices, whose circuit-riding duties made the office
too physically demanding for some.47 The first Chief Justice, John
46 See infra app., tbl. 1.
47 In the early years of the federaljudiciary, the pay was low, the work was sparse,
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Jay, resigned to become Governor of New York.48 When he was
reappointed to the position of ChiefJustice byJohn Adams in 1800,
he returned his commission, explaining to the President:
I left the Bench perfectly convinced that under a System so
defective, it would not obtain the Energy weight and Dignity which
are essential to its affording due support to the national Gov-
ern[ment]; nor acquire the public Confidence and Respect, which,
as the last Resort of the Justice of the nation, it should possess.
Hence I am induced to doubt both the Propriety and Expediency
of my returning to the Bench under the present System....49
Jay observed that, given the circuit-riding requirements of the
office, "independent of other Considerations, the State of my
Health removes every Doubt-it being clearly and decidedly
incompetent to the fatigues incident to the office." 50 Jay's refusal
to accept his commission opened the way for the appointment of
John Marshall to lead the Court.51 Thus circuit riding, the aspect
of Supreme Court service that generated the most dissatisfaction
among justices over the first century of the federal judiciary, was
indirectly responsible for the appointment of the man whose
leadership of the Supreme Court would be among the most
important factors in elevating the stature of the office from its
unappealing status in the first decade of the Republic. During
Marshall's tenure, only two justices resigned from the Court, and
both left for health reasons.
5 2
The next highest percentage of departing judges occurred in the
1860s. The 22% departure rate can be accounted for almost
entirely by the fifteen judges who resigned (and the one who was
impeached) as a consequence of their Confederate service or
and the physical requirements involved with holding court were quite onerous. See
Maeva Marcus & Emily F. Van Tassel,Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System,
1789-1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTrrUTIONAL CoMrrY (Robert
Katzmann ed., 1988) (discussing the burdens of court duty in the first decade of the
Republic).
48 ELDER WITr, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
800 (2d ed. 1990).
49 Letter from John Jay to John Adams (Jan. 2, 1801), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 147 (Maeva
Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800].
so Id.; see also Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 47.
51 ChiefJustice Marshall was appointed by PresidentJohn Adams in 1801 and
served until his death onJuly 6, 1835. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 286, 797 (1922).
52 These were Justices Alfred Moore and Gabriel Duvall. See 1 id. at 174-75.
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sympathies. 53 Judge James Hughes returned to private practice
because he found life on the Court of Claims "too tame." 54 The
other nine resignations unrelated to the Civil War all were due to
old age or poor health. Of the ten judges who left the bench for
reasons other than health or age in the 1870s, five did so under the
cloud of congressional investigation.
55
The highest departure rate in the twentieth century occurred
when roughly 12% of the federal judiciary left the bench in the
decade between 1910 and 1920. In 1911, salaries for Supreme
Court justices went up by $2000, following a recent increase of
$1000 in district and circuit judge salaries.56 Between 1911 and the
next judicial salary increase in 1926, however, real wages eroded by
approximately 55% for Supreme Court justices, 67% for circuit
court judges, and 69% for district court judges.5 7 Of the eighteen
judges that resigned during the decade, thirteen left to take other
employment, and three of those thirteen explicitly cited the
inadequate salary of their office as their reason for stepping down.
Five others departed from the bench after allegations of misbehav-
ior were made against them.
5 8
53 See infra app., tbl. 1. One of these judges, Henry Boyce of the Western District
of Louisiana, left the bench in January of 1861. Reports of his departure conflict;
however, given the date and place, it is reasonable to suspect motivations related to
the secession of the South.
54 1 MARION T. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY 23
(1976).
55 Charles Taylor Sherman (D. Ohio) resigned in 1873 after corruption charges
were leveled against him in the House of Representatives. See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS,
supra note 14, ch. 79, § 2511, at 1019 (describing House investigation into conduct
of Sherman). Mark W. Delahay (D. Kan.) resigned sometime after he was impeached
in 1873 but before being tried by the Senate. See id. §§ 2504-05, at 1009-10
(discussing investigation of Delahay). Richard Busteed (D. Ala.) resigned while under
congressional investigation for impeachment charges of nonresidence. See id. § 2512,
at 1020-21 (discussing investigation of Busteed). Edward Henry Durell (D. La.)
resigned in 1875 after a House committee recommended his impeachment for
"bankruptcyirregularities." See id. §§ 2506-09, at 1012-15 (discussinginvestigation of
Durell). William Story (W.D. Ark.) resigned after appearing before a House
committee with "lame and disconnected" testimony about inordinately large
expenditures he had approved for his court. See The Daily Gazette, ARK. GAZETTE,
June 9, 1874, at 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 122-27 (describing
investigation and subsequent resignation of Story).
16 Calculations are based on salary figures, in current dollars and in 1983 dollars,
published in POSNER, supra note 31, app. B (providing salaries of federal judges in
1983 dollars from 1800 to 1983).
57 See id. at 348.
58 One of those accused was Judge Archbald, who was removed through the
impeachment process. See BUSHNELL, supra note 8, at 217-42 (discussing misdeeds,
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The resignation rate steadily declined from 8% in the 1920s to
4% in the 1940s. The lowest departure rates in the history of the
judiciary occurred during the 1950s (2%) and 1960s (1%). The
departure rate then grew to just over 3.6% for the decade between
1970 and 1980 and dropped marginally in the 1980s to 3.5%.
Although the absolute number of departures in the 1980s was
large-thirty judges resigned-the rate of departure was actually
lower than it had been in all but three other decades in the history
of the federal judiciary.
59
What is most striking about the resignation rate of federal
judges is the fact that it has fluctuated only slightly since the 1940s,
contrary to the belief of many observers, including a recent Chief
Justice. 60 If large size and low salary are having an adverse impact
on the prestige of the federal judiciary, and thus on the desire of
people to serve, the negative effects of these circumstances have yet
to be reflected by large-scale resignations. The effect may be
occurring at the other end of the process, as evidenced by increas-
ing declinations to serve.
61
impeachment, and conviction of Archibald). The other departingjudges were judge
Peter Grosscup, Judge Cornelius Hanford, Judge Daniel Thew Wright, and Judge
John Augustine Marshall. See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, ch. 202, § 526,
at 745 (discussing impeachment proceedings against Hanford); id. § 528, at 751
(discussing investigation of Wright); infra text accompanying note 120 (discussing
Marshall's resignation to avoid scandal); infra text accompanying note 244 (discussing
resignation of Grosscup). Jacobus ten Broeck, in his study of the five impeachments
from 1903 to 1936, identifies anotherjudge in that decade-Judge SamuelAlschuler-
as resigning within the year during which the House began investigating him. See
Jacobus ten Broeck, Partisan Politics and FederalJudgeship Impeachment Since 1903, 23
MINN. L. REV. 185, 185 n.3 (1939). It is clear that Alschuler's retirement was not
connected to allegations of misbehavior. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19
(discussing exoneration of Alschuler by the House).
' This number does not include the judges who "retired from the office" under
some form of what is codified under 28 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1988). An additional
fourteen judges "resigned" under this provision once they were eligible for their
pensions under the age and service requirements. For a discussion of these
"retirements from office," see infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
60 See THE IN-AND-OUTERS: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES AND TRANSIENT GOvERN-
MENT IN WASHINGTON 135 (G. Calvin MacKenzie ed., 1987) (quoting a letter from
Chief Justice Warren Burger to Presidential Press Secretary Nicholas F. Brady);
Charles Mohr, Washington Talk: Congress; Forget the Deficit; A Crisis Is Looming: Raises,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1988, at B8 (noting that Warren Burger told the Quadrennial
Commission that "more judges left the bench in his tenure as ChiefJudge 'than from
the beginning of the Constitution in 1789 up to 1969'").
61 Former White House Counsel Fred Fielding, who screened judicial candidates
for five years during the Reagan administration, has indicated that many qualified
lawyers quickly removed themselves from consideration on the basis of the low salary.
See Bill McAllister, TheJudiciary's 'Quiet Crisis": Prestige Doesn't Pay the Tuition, WASH.
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2. WhyJudges Resign
The specific reasons judges have given62 for their resignations
cover a broad range and sometimes have multiple components. As
Figure 3 illustrates, these reasons range from the relatively common
(poor health or low salary) to the unique (the case of Judge Mahlon
Dickerson, who resigned so that his brother might be appointed in
his place).6"
POST, Jan. 21, 1987, at A19. Determining whether declinations have increased over
time, and for what reason, would require research not only in presidential papers and
Department ofJustice files, but also in the papers of the individual senators who were
in office when judicial vacancies occurred in their states. If more potential judicial
candidates removed themselves from consideration during the 1980s, their withdrawal
could be attributed to the nature of the pool of lawyers from which the Reagan
administration selected. Of Ronald Reagan's 372 appointments to the Article III
bench, a higher proportion were recruited from large law firms (firms with 25 to
more than 100 partners and associates) than had been the case with any of the
previous four administrations. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy:
Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 321, 325 (1989). Over
40% of his district court appointees and over 50% of his appellate court appointees
had a net worth of over half a million dollars. See id. at 321, tbl. 1, 324, tbl. 3.
62 1 speak of "reasons" for resignation throughout this Article for the sake of
convenience, but it might be more accurate to say "reasons judges have offered for
resigning, or what they have done after they resigned." There is such thing as an
overqualification, however.
63 For a detailed account of the machinations leading to Dickerson's appointment
and subsequent resignation six months later, see KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF
JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERALJUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-
1861, at 34-35 (1979).
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FIGURE 3
Reasons for Resignation, 1789-1992
Table 2 of the Appendix lists the seventeen groupings that I used to
analyze judicial resignations, along with the names of the judges
included in those groupings.6 4  For the purposes of this Article,
however, reasons cited for resignation can be grouped into five
64 Some of the categories used in the Appendix have the potential for overlap.
For example, virtually all of the "inadequate salary" resignations could be subsumed
in the "returned to private practice" category; similarly, many of the "returned to
private practice" resignations may have been due to inadequate salary. It is also clear
that some judges had multiple reasons for resigning. Nevertheless, I have assigned
each judge to a single category (as listed in Table 2), and have broken out narrower
categories from the general where those specific reasons seemed likely to be of
interest to other researchers (or where I was unable to fit a singlejudge into a general
category, as with Mahlon Dickerson, for example). For the discussion in this Article,
I have brought these categories back together.
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major categories: (1) age and/or health; (2) appointment to other
office or pursuit of elected office; (3) dissatisfaction; (4) return to
private practice, other employment, inadequate salary; and (5)
allegations of misbehavior (including impeachments and convic-
tions). Each of these will be discussed in turn.
a. Age and/or Health (Including Disability and Pre-1919 Retirement)
Not surprisingly, judges have offered the pressures of advanced
age or poor health as their primary reasons for resignation. During
most of the nineteenth century, Congress provided no incentive for
aging or incapacitated judges to leave the bench;65 as a conse-
quence, many judges remained in office after they were no longer
able to carry out their duties. On the other hand, many other
judges chose to relinquish their lifetime salary once it became clear
to them that they could no longer execute the duties attached to the
salary. This issue is discussed separately in Part III, covering
retirement and disability.
b. Appointment to Other Office or Pursuit of Elected Office
Resignations to accept appointments to other offices or to run
for (or accept) elected office have occurred regularly since the first
decade of the Republic, following in the tradition set by John Jay
and John Rutledge. 66 Although such appointments have a long
history, their occurrence has been relatively infrequent until recent-
ly. Throughout the nineteenth century, the President did not often
look to the federal judiciary as a source for other government
appointments. 67 In recent years, however, Presidents have select-
ed federal judges to serve as director of the Federal Bureau of
6 The legislative responses to age and incapacity are discussed in some detail infra
part III.66 John Rutledge was the first federal judge to resign, leaving the Supreme Court
in 1791 to accept ajudicial position in South Carolina. See WrIT, supra note 48, at
801. JohnJay left four years later to become governor of New York. See id. at 800.
67 Over the course of the nineteenth century only 12 judges resigned to accept
appointment to other offices, compared with 27 between 1900 and 1992. See infra
app., tbl. 2. Of the 12 nineteenth-century resignations, only nine were to accept
presidential appointments. See VAN TASSEL, supra note 14, at app. (describing the
appointments ofJudges Powhatan Ellis,John Young Mason, Alfred Conkling, George
Purnell Fisher, John C. Davis, William Henry Hunt, Walter Quintin Gresham, and
Henry Blodgett). Judge Gresham counts for two resignations, having resigned a
districtjudgeship to become U.S. Postmaster General under Chester A. Arthur, and
a Seventh Circuitjudgeship to become Grover Cleveland's Secretary of State. See id.
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Investigation (FBI) three times;68 other appointments have includ-
ed an Ambassador to the United Nations, 69 two Solicitors Gener-
al, 0 and a Secretary of Education.71
c. Dissatisfaction
"Dissatisfaction" is something of a catch-all category. The
reasons for a judge's inclusion here range from resignations
attributed to real, generalized unhappiness with systemic or
institutional factors associated with judging, to a desire of the
resigning judge to move on to other endeavors. In the latter case,
the resigning judge has sometimes specifically stated that it was not
dissatisfaction with the office, but the incompatibility of a federal
judgeship with personal goals.72 Such judges are included under
the heading of dissatisfaction because their resignations indicate a
desire to do something other than judging.
73
8 President Carter appointed Eighth Circuit Judge William Webster as FBI
director in 1978, and he served until 1987. See Philip Shenon, The Reagan White
House: Man in the News; Webster of F.B.I. Named by Reagan As C.LA. Director, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1987, at Al (discussing Webster's career, including his appointment
as FBI Director in 1978). In 1987, President Bush appointedJudge William Sessions
of the Western District of Texas to succeed Webster. See Oswald Johnson et al.,
Reagan Names "ToughJudge"As FBIDirector, L.A. TIMEs,July 25,1987, at 1 (discussing
Sessions's appointment). President Clinton recently appointed yet another federal
judge to the FBI post: Judge Louis Frech of the Southern District of New York. See
Paul Bedard & Michael Hedges, FBI Nominee Gets Praise from Many Quarters, WASH.
TIMES, July 21, 1993, at A3 (discussing Freeh's appointment).
6 9 Justice Arthur Goldberg resigned from the Supreme Court in 1965 to accept
LyndonJohnson's appointment to the United Nations. See HenryJ. Reske,Justice
Goldberg Reflects on Remarkable Career, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1986, at 4 (noting
Goldberg's resignation in 1965 to become United Nations ambassador).
7 0 Judge Kenneth Starr was appointed Solicitor General by George Bush in 1989.
See Maralee Schwartz et al., The New Regime: Starr Selected for Solicitor General, WASH.
POST, Feb. 2, 1989, at A23. Previously, Jimmy Carter had appointed Sixth Circuit
Judge Wade McCree to that office in 1977. See Eric Pace, Wade H. McCreeJr. Dies at
67; Was Judge and Solicitor General, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1987, at B6.
71 Ninth CircuitJudge Shirley Hufstediler resigned her judgeship to become the
first secretary of the new Department of Education underJimmy Carter. See Phyllis
Theroux, The Judge Goes to Washington, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at
41 (discussing Hufstedlers's career, including her appointment as Secretary of
Education in 1980).
7 2 JudgeJames B. MillerJr., resigned from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Maryland in 1986 "in order to pursue other interests." Letter fromJudgeJames
R. Miller, Jr., to President Ronald Reagan (May 7, 1986) (on file with the AOUSC,
Human Resources Division).
73 Virtually every resignation could, in some sense, be attributed to "dissatisfac-
tion" of one sort or another. As the following discussion indicates, however, it is
useful to separate out resignations that indicate either a stated dissatisfaction with
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Nevertheless, there are judges who have left office for reasons
relating to specific aspects of the office. Judges who have left
because of institutional dissatisfaction in recent years include Judge
Robert Bork, who, after his failed nomination to the Supreme
Court, stated his wish for a more open forum than the federal
bench provides from which to comment on the state of the
judiciary, 74 and Judge J. Lawrence Irving, who resigned in protest
over what he concluded to be the excessive harshness of the new
federal sentencing guidelines, 75 stating: "'If I remain on the bench
I have no choice but to follow the law .... I just can't, in good
conscience, continue to do this. ' " 76 Judge Griffin Bell returned to
private practice a few months before President Jimmy Carter
appointed him to the office of Attorney General, saying of the Fifth
Circuit, "the work had become dreary, given the heavy load of
criminal and habeas corpus matters." 77 Earlier in the twentieth
century, Justice John Hessin Clarke, with a touch of racism that is
ironic considering his idealistic reason for resigning (he left the
bench to "promote American participation in the League of
Nations"), informed President Harding that he would "die happier"
working for world peace than he would if he continued spending his
time "determining whether a drunken Indian had been deprived of
his land before he died or whether the digging of a ditch was
constitutional or not."
78
Although the judges who resign because of dissatisfaction often
have little in common, the unifying thread running through many
of their reasons for resignation is a sense of restrictiveness in the
office of judge. This discomfort speaks more to a chafing at the
specific aspects of the office or a general statement that the person and the office do
not fit each other.
' In his letter of resignation to President Reagan, Judge Bork stated that
the crux of the matter is that I wish to speak, write, and teach about law and
other issues of public policy more extensively and more freely than is
possible in my present position .... Constraints of propriety and
seemliness limit the topics a federal judge may address and the public
positions he may advocate.
Letter fromJudge Robert Bork to President Ronald Reagan (Jan. 7,1988) (files of the
AOUSC, Human Resources Division).
75 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 (1992).
76 Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S.Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at 22.
77 Letter from Judge Griffin Bell to Judge Irving R. Kaufman (July 16, 1980)
(appended to a memorandum from Joseph Spaniol, Jr., to Alfred Zuck (Nov. 12,
1980) (on file with the AOUSC, Human Resources Division)).
78 WRIT, supra note 48, at 854.
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requirements of exhibiting "judicial temperament" on the part of
individual judges than to a need for any particular institutional
change in the office. To the extent that potential nominees can be
briefed about the restrictions on lifestyle inherent injudicial service,
resignations stemming from a failure to appreciate the full extent
of the limitations and frustrations of the office might be lessened by
more careful acceptance of the office. "Dissatisfaction" resigna-
tions, however, do not seem to raise issues of discipline or removal.
They point more directly toward a need for congressional attention
to the quality of the office.
d. Return to Private Practice, Other Employment, Inadequate Salary
Most judges who have left office for reasons other than age or
health have taken other employment immediately after leaving the
bench, and many have cited that "other employment" as their
reason for leaving the judiciary. In some cases, this category is the
most opaque for purposes of determining precisely why judges have
decided to leave. If judges resign from the bench before being
forced to by old age or ill health, it is quite likely that they will
subsequently be employed (unless they are independently wealthy).
Dissatisfaction with the job, the inadequacy ofjudicial salaries, and
pressures stemming from allegations of misbehavior or incapacity
are all reasons that might underlie a decision to leave the bench for
other employment. Where possible, such reasons have been
separately identified, and the judges have been placed in the
appropriately specific category.79 For the majority ofjudges taking
other employment, however, we are left to speculate about their
reasons based on changes in aggregate numbers and historical con-
text.
Over the last 200 years, relatively fewjudges have explicitly cited
low pay as their reason for resignation. For the period studied, only
twenty-one judges have actually said as much, but forty-nine
additional judges returned to private practice or accepted other
employment. Seventy-one judges resigned to engage in other
employment, excluding those appointed or elected to other office
and those who resigned to run for other office but were defeated.
It is reasonable to suppose that in some instances salary was a
factor, and in other cases, different considerations came into play.
For instance, in 1824, after only five years on the court, forty-seven-
79 See supra note 64.
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year-old Theodric Bland, the district judge for Maryland, resigned
to accept the office of Chancellor, the highest-paying judicial post
in Maryland. 80 He may have taken the post for financial, personal,
or status-related reasons. Similarly, Judge Julius Mayer, who left the
Second Circuit in 1924 to return to private practice, cited inade-
quate salary as one reason for his resignation.
81
Judges have complained about the low salary of the office from
the earliest years of the Republic. Nathaniel Pendleton, district
judge for Georgia, wrote to President Washington in 1791 express-
ing his dissatisfaction with the position:
When I solicited the appointment of Judge of this District, I
imagined Congress would have made a more ample provision for
their Judges; but having, at my own solicitation had the honor to
be nominated by you, I could not with propriety refuse serving:
altho it will readily be admitted by those who knew the extant of
my practice at the bar, that the salary allowed me, is but a small
compensation, nor is it indeed an adequate provision for a family
in this Country.
8 2
Pendleton stayed on for five more years before resigning in 1796
because the salary was not adequate to educate his children.
83
In 1857 Justice Benjamin Curtis resigned as a direct result of
serious disagreements over the Dred Scott case;84 however, his
dissatisfactions with the office were personal as well as legal and
political. It was later reported that
[i]n letters to his friends he stated that his main reason for
[resigning] was that the salary was so small,--it was then $6000,--he
could not support his family in Washington, without expending,
in addition to his salary, his entire private income, and that he did
not deem it his duty to do so.
8 5
80 See H.H. WALKER LEwIs &JAMES F. SCHNEIDER, A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
THE U.S. DISTRIcT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, 1790-1990, at 28 (1990)
(noting Bland's appointment); 1 CONwAYW. SAMS & ELIHU S. RILEY, THE BENCH AND
BAR OF MARYLAND 268 (1901).
81 See Judge Mayer Dies of Heart Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1925, at 1.
82 Letter from Nathaniel Pendleton to George Washington (Mar. 5, 1791), in
Marcus & Perry, supra note 49, at 722 (footnotes omitted).
83 See id. at 723 n.3.
84 See 2 THEJuSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1968: THEIR
LIvEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 904 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) (noting
that "[d]issension and suspicion over rendering... Dred Scott opinions provided the
catalyst for Curtis to resign from the Supreme Court").
85 Albert Dickerman, The Business of the Federal Courts and the Salaries of the Judges,
24 AM. L. REV. 78, 85 (1890).
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It may be that salary alone is not the determinative factor in
"other employment" resignations. After all, over the entire period
studied, less than 5% of the judiciary resigned to take other
positions. However, when the age at appointment and years of
service of the "other employment" judges are tabulated, suggestive
statistics emerge. The average age at appointment for this group of
judges is 45.7, with a median age of forty-two; their average service
on the bench is seven years.
86
FIGURE 4
Average Age at Appointment and Number of Years on
Bench for Judges Resigning Under Categories
of Inadequate Salary, Other Employment,
or Return to Private Practice
Resignations per Decade
4 2 2 2 4 3 3 9 7 5 2 2 2 8 15
60 -I J I -;i ,
* Average Age at Appoinment
(] Average Years on Bench
Decade
See generally AOUSC Report, supra note 31, app.
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Without statistics for the average age at appointment ofjudges who
stay on the bench until retirement or death, no conclusive state-
ments can be made about the import of these numbers.8 7 Never-
theless, it may be that judges who are appointed at a relatively
young age will be more likely to leave the bench to pursue other
endeavors than those who are appointed when they can be expected
not only to have amassed more experience, but more financial
security as well. 8
The number of people who have declined to be considered for
federal judgeships because of the low salary is undoubtedly far
greater than the number resigning from judgeships for that reason.
Nonetheless, this number can only be approximated. In the
nineteenth century, when some Presidents had a habit of nominat-
ing individuals for judgeships without consulting them first, a
number of candidates declined nomination or declined to serve
after confirmation because of the low salary.8 9 For instance, when
looking for someone for the newly created judgeship of the Western
District of Louisiana, President Taylor had difficulty finding a
nominee among his wealthy Whig acquaintances willing to serve on
a salary of $2000 a year.90 His first nominee, James G. Campbell,
turned down the nomination (after he learned of it) in favor of his
lucrative law practice. 91  Campbell recommended that Taylor
appoint in his stead state Circuit CourtJudgeJohn Kingsbury Elgee,
who, explained Campell, possessed "an ample fortune which will
enable him to accept the appointment, for with the salary attached
to it, the Judge will have to support the office and not the office the
87 Although one study of congressional tenure looked at the tenure of federal
judges leaving the bench between 1974 and 1985 and concluded that the average
tenure of those judges was 13.5 years, the study did not separate out judges who
resigned from those who retired or died in office. See Mark Tushnet et al.,Judicial
Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEx. L. REv. 967, 982-83 (1988).
Presumably, the average tenure would increase if judges who resigned were not
included.
8 An article in the Washington Post in 1987 (before federal judges received a
significant pay raise in 1989) cited manyjudges as warning that "the practice in the
Reagan and Carter administrations of naming younger lawyers to the bench is likely
to result in more resignations, as judges who have had little time to accumulate
wealth discover the costs of educating their children, a problem Burger said one
judge dubbed 'maltuition.'" McAllister, supra note 61, at A19.
9 judges who were confirmed but declined to serve have not been included in
this study except anecdotally.
go See HALL, supra note 63, at 86.
91 See id. at 87 (noting that Campbell "preferred his lucrative law practice and
planting to the inadequate federal judicial salary").
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Judge."9 2 Taylor issued a recess commission to Elgee, who also
promptly declined, preferring the lesser travel involved in his better
paying state circuit judgeship.93 President Tyler ran into similar
problems when one of his nominees, William Brockenbrough, de-
clined because of the "utter inadequacy of the compensation,"
94
and another, Charles Dewey, turned down the job after confirma-
tion because his salary as Indiana Supreme CourtJustice was $1500
higher than the federal judgeship.9 5
92 id.
93 See id.
94 Id. at 49.
" See id. at 52 (noting that the prestige of the state judgeship was also a factor in
Dewey's decision).
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TABLE 1




to Private Other Inadequate ment to Elected Office-
Decade Practice Employment Salary Other Office Office Defeated Total
1789-1799 3 0 1 1 2 0 7
1800-1809 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1810-1819 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1820-1829 0 2 0 0 3 0 5
1830-1839 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
1840-1849 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
1850-1859 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1860-1869 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870-1879 0 0 2 1 1 0 4
1880-1889 1 2 1 3 0 0 7
1890-1899 3 0 0 2 1 0 6
1900-1909 2 1 0 1 0 0 4
1910-1919 4 2 3 0 2 1 12
1920-1929 5 0 2 1 0 1 9
1930-1939 5 0 0 2 1 1 9
1940-1949 1 1 0 6 1 0 9
1950-1959 0 0 2 3 0 1 6
1960-1969 0 2 0 1 0 1 4
1970-1979 3 2 3 4 0 1 13
1980-1989 9 1 5 7 0 0 22
1990- 1 0 1 1 0 0 3
Total 37 13 21 37 13 6 127
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In the twentieth century, salary became a source of dissatisfac-
tion during several different periods. In the decade between 1910
and 1920, the judicial departure rate spiked to its highest point
since the 1870s. In the 1870s, four judges left for other employ-
ment or other office; only one explicitly cited salary as a reason. By
contrast, in the 1910s, twelve judges left for other employment or
other office, and three cited salary as their motivation for doing so.
From the 1910s to the 1960s, the judicial departure rate declined
steadily, and then moved upward in the 1970s until it reached the
4% rate seen in the 1940s. Seventeen of the twenty judges depart-
ing in the 1970s accepted other employment or other office. Three
of those leaving in that decade cited salary as their primary
motivation. In the 1980s, the number resigning because of
inadequate salary climbed to five; from 1990 to 1992, one judge
resigned for that reason.
During the 1970s, a group of federal judges was so angered by
Congress's refusal to address the erosion of the judges' real wages
that they took the extraordinary step of suing Congress over their
remuneration. 96 One hundred and forty-four judges went to court
to challenge Congress,97 claiming that their salaries had been
96 See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1009 (1978).
Judges have gone to court over salary matters several times in the past to
challenge the constitutionality of taxing the salaries of Article IIIjudges. See e.g.,
O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1939) (holding that Congress did not
exceed its constitutional power in "providing that United States judges.., shall not
enjoy immunity from the indices of taxation to which everyone else within the defined
classes of income is subjected"); Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501, 509 (1925) (holding
that while Congress has the power to fix the compensation earned byjudges at stated
intervals, "there is no power [for Congress] to tax ajudge of a court of the United
States on account of the salary prescribed for him by law"), overruled by O'Malley, 307
U.S. at 283; Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 264 (1920) (holding that Congress was in
violation of the Constitution by assessing a tax upon the net income of a U.S. district
judge which functioned to diminish his official salary), overruled by O'Malley, 307 U.S.
at 281-83. In the 1930s, Congress reduced the salaries of retired judges, but the
Supreme Court held the salary reduction unconstitutional in Booth v. United States,
291 U.S. 339 (1934). In 1990, another 10judges sued to be removed from the social
security system. See Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over a complaint by a group of
federal judges alleging that their salary has been diminished as a result of the
imposition of social security taxes); Paul C. Roberts, Confronting Social Security with a
Timely Test, WAsH. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1990, at D4.
97 Forty-four judges filed suit originally; by the time the case went to court their
numbers had swelled by another hundred judges. See Lesley Oelsner, 44 Federal
Judges to Sue for Pay Lost to Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1976, at Al, A23; see also
Leslie Oelsner, A.B.A. Chief Backs Judges' Suit on Pay; Calls Congress 'Unfair,' N.Y.
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unconstitutionally reduced by congressional failure to adjust for
inflation.98 The Court of Claims rejected their argument. The
morale of the judiciary was particularly low at this time, and the
Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries (known
as the Quadrennial Commission) reiterated in several reports Chief
Justice Warren Burger's assertion that judicial resignations due to
inadequate salary during the 1970s and 1980s exceeded all judicial
resignations for all reasons combined for the preceding 200
years. 100 Although a close look at the history of judicial resig-
nations proves the statement to be inaccurate, the sentiment
suggests the depth of concern that the salary issue evoked.
In his 1962 book on judicial malfeasance, authorJoseph Borkin
suggested that problems with judicial corruption tend to crop up
during hard economic times. 10 1 His focus was on the judicial
scandals that surfaced during the Great Depression, a period during
which there were eight congressional impeachment investigations,
one removal, a resignation of ajudge under investigation, as well as
the criminal conviction of another judge. 10 2 The only time period
for which there were as many formal allegations of judicial misbe-
havior was the 1870s, when Congress investigated eight judges, five
of whom resigned-one after being impeached but before his
trial.1 03 Six of the eight judges were charged with offenses at
least peripherally involving financial irregularities. 10 4  Unlike
during the 1910s, however, Congress raised judicial salaries such
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1976, at 41.
91 See Atkins, 556 F.2d at 1033.
9 See id. at 1051.
100 See COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE & JUDICIAL SALARIES, FAINE
FOR OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS: THE REPORT OF THE 1989 COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES 26-27 (1989); COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE & JUDICIAL SALARIES, THE QUIET CRISIS: A REPORT BY THE 1984-85
COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES app. C (1985);
COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE & JUDICIAL SALARIES, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES 28 (1980); see also
CORPORATE COMM. FOR FAIR COMPENSATION OF THE FED. JUDICIARY AND THE AM.
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, PROMISES MADE, PROMISES STILL UNKEPT: RESTORATION
OF INFLATION-INDUCED SALARY CUTS FOR TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 48-49 (1986).
101 See BORKIN, supra note 14, at 207-10.
102 See id.
103 See VAN TASSEL, supra note 14, at 24. For a discussion of the 1870 investiga-
tions, see infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
104 See 3 HINDs' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, ch. 79, §§ 2504-16 (describing the
charges againstJudges Delahay, Bunell, Sherman, Busteed, Blodgett, and Boarman);
BORKN, supra note 14, at 233, 238 (Judges Humphries and Wylie). The House did
not record the charges against the other two judges.
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that real wages actually increased over the course of the de-
cade.10 5 For the Supreme Court, real wages increased 44% in
1983 dollars; circuit court salaries increased by 61%, and district
court salaries increased by 82%. Supreme Court justices received
a salary increase of $4000 over the course of the decade, from
$6000 to $10,000. Circuit court judge salaries went from $5000 to
$6000 over the same time period, and district judge salaries
apparently did not increase at all. 1  On the other hand, the
1980s, a period of boom economic times, saw both significant
malfeasance and steady erosion of judicial salaries.10 7 This link
suggests that low salaries relative to the rest of the legal profession
may have some effect on judicial misbehavior.
Resignations in order to go into private practice also raise
concerns regarding both the specter of judges giving preferential
treatment to litigants who may be future employers and the
perception of impropriety that such resignations raise. For
instance, when fifty-eight-year-oldJudge Royce Savage left the bench
in 1961 after twenty years of service, he ran into a barrage of
criticism. It did not escape public notice that he was going to work
as general counsel to Gulf Oil Corporation less than two years after
acquitting Gulf of criminal antitrust charges. 08 The New York
Times editorialized:
No one has suggested, nor is there the slightest grounds for
thinking, thatJudge Savage was moved by improper considerations
in the anti-trust case; and there is no law against his now going to
work for Gulf. Nevertheless, he showed poor judgment in doing
so, because his action tends to lessen public confidence in the
independence and integrity of the Federal Judiciary.1
09
President Kennedy, in accepting Judge Savage's resignation, took
note of the circumstances of his departure and observed:
105 See PosNER, supra note 31, app. B, at 347.
106 See id.
107 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, U.S. Judges Turn to the Hill for Help on Pay, Work, 47
CONG. Q. 1322, 1325 (1989) (noting that Congress rejected a proposedjudicial pay
raise because of public opposition); Anthony Lewis, What Kind ofJudges?, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 9, 1989, at A31 (noting that "the rise in prices in recent years has had a
devastating effect on federal judges, reducing them from what was a secure if not
lavish economic status to genteel insecurity").108 See DAviD STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES 8 (1974).
109 TheJudiciar's Commitment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1961, at 36, quoted in STEIN,
supra note 108, at 9.
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the reason that [judges] are appointed for life is so that there
can... be no actual improprieties [and] no appearance of
impropriety .... I don't think that anyone should accept a
Federal judgeship unless prepared to fill it for life because I think
the maintenance of the integrity of the Judiciary is so impor-
tant.
110
Hugh Martin Morris, a district judge in Delaware, ran into similar
criticism when he accepted a retainer from Universal Oil Products
the day after he left the bench to join a corporate law firm a short
time after ruling on cases involving Universal."' Kennesaw
Mountain Landis, on the other hand, resigned under pressure of a
threatened impeachment which arose primarily because he accepted
the $42,500 per annum job as the first commissioner of baseball
while still serving on the bench.
11 2
The primary reason for resignation outside of age or health is
alternative employment. When the number of judges leaving
because of inadequate salary is added to the numbers of judges
leaving to return to private practice, to accept appointment to other
office, to seek or accept elected office, or to engage in other
employment, the result-128 resignations-exceeds all other reasons
combined, including resignations for age- or health-related reasons.
When appointments to other office and campaigns for elected office
are excluded, the number of resignations is seventy-two, although
in many instances it is not possible to derive what the underlying
motivation might be for leaving the bench. Ajudge leaving to avoid
investigation or prosecution, for instance, would be likely to take
other employment and cite this as his reason. What can be said,
however, is that judges who resign to take other employment, for
whatever reason, still represent less than 5% of the judiciary for the
entire period studied.
e. Allegations of Misbehavior (Including Impeachments and Convictions)
The rate ofjudicial departures following allegations of misbehav-
ior is much higher than either the impeachment or the conviction
rate. As indicated earlier, twenty-two judges have resigned under
fire; these resignations are discussed in detail in the following Part.
110 STEIN, supra note 108, at 8-9.
111 
See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, STuDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRcurr, 1790-1980, at 195 (1982).
112 See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 536, at 768-69.
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C. Summay
While the Article III judiciary has grown enormously over two
centuries, from nineteen judgeships in 1789, to 829 judgeships in
1990, the rate of "premature" judicial departures has actually
declined precipitously for most of the twentieth century. In the
1910s the departure rate was 12%; in the decade of the 1980s the
rate stood at 3.5%, which represents the lowest departure rate for
all of but three decades of our history. This indicates that while
judges may be vocal in their dissatisfaction with the current state of
the judiciary, their dissatisfaction is not manifested in increased
rates of resignation.
Statistics indicate that less that 5% of all Article IIIjudges have
left office prematurely and returned to private practice or accepted
some other form of legal employment. It would be useful and
advisable for judicial policymakers-both in Congress and in the
judiciary--to be aware of any significant increase in the proportion
of this type of resignation, since such resignations may signal
dissatisfaction with the judiciary-particularly renumerative-that
could manifest itself in misbehavior in judges who stay on the
bench. To this end, such information should be kept up-to-date by
either the Federal Judicial Center or the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts.
II. INVESTIGATIONS, PROSECUTIONS, AND THE VALUE OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The chilling of judicial independence has been at issue in the
context of actions taken not only by the legislative branch, but also
by the executive branch and the states. Similarly, the judiciary itself
has at times been accused of trying to control or influence the
actions of particular judges. 13 The following discussion is intend-
ed to be suggestive of the range of circumstances in which federal
judges have been subject to investigations and to threats of
investigation, prosecution, or impeachment. It is not suggested that
the intent has always been to coerce particular judges or the
judiciary as a whole. It is suggested, however, that such measures
can have the effect of chilling judicial independence and-setting
113 See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 75-78 (1970) (involving a
petition byU.S. DistrictJudge Steven Chandler challenging the powers of the Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit after the Circuit found thatJudge Chandler was unable
or unwilling to discharge his duties efficiently).
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aside the constitutional questions-should be understood as a poten-
tially troubling matter of policy.
A. Judicial Resignations Following Allegations
of Misbehavior
As previously noted, Congress has removed seven Article III
judges in the last 200 years. 114 But between 1818, when Georgia's
district judge, William Stephens, resigned during a congressional
investigation,1 15 and 1993, at least twenty-two other Article III
judges resigned or retired from the bench under a cloud of
impropriety. In some cases, there is no hard evidence linking the
resignation with the investigation or other action against the judge.
In most of these cases, however, the proximity of the resignation to
the investigation or allegations against the judge is, at the very least,
suggestive of a connection. This apparent connection should not be
viewed uncritically. For example, in the case of Seventh Circuit
Judge Samuel Alschuler, who several commentators have indicated
retired in response to a congressional investigation, 116 the prox-
imity of retirement to allegations seems to be clearly coincidental.
Representative Everett Dirksen of Illinois apparently brought
accusations against Alschuler on the floor of the House for political
reasons.1 17 After referral to the Judiciary Committee, the resolu-
tion was tabled. Dirksen's colleagues condemned him for the
proceedings, stating that "[n]o mitigating facts or circumstances
have been discovered by this committee touching the conduct of the
said Everett M. Dirksen, in basing upon a misstatement of facts a
false accusation of personal and official dishonesty against the said
Samuel Alschuler." 118 The historian of the Seventh Circuit notes
thatJudge Alschuler and his supporters "felt completely vindicated
by the House report." 19 Judge Alschuler did not retire until nine
114 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
115 See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2489, at 986.
116 See BORg.IN, supra note 14, at 219-20 (pointing out thatJudge Alschuler was the
subject of a congressional inquiry); Grimes, supra note 2, at 1213 & n.24 (noting that
some judges, including Judge Alschuler, have chosen to resign when "apparently
feeling the sting of a House inquiry").
117 See RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH CIRcurr, 1891-1941, at
121 (1981) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1802, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1935)) (reporting
that Congressman Igoe charged Dirksen with using the accusations against Judge




months after the House had exonerated him.
The list of judges resigning or retiring to avoid sanction for
inappropriate behavior-or perhaps to avoid bringing discredit on
the federal bench-should not be taken as definitive. No record is
kept of such resignations, and discovering the motivation for each
resignation is often serendipitous. For instance, when Judge John
Augustine Marshall of the U.S. District Court of Utah resigned in
1915, no congressional investigation had been launched or threat-
ened. Still, Judge Marshall indicated that he would resign after he,
in the words of one observer:
became enmeshed in a scandal involving the cleaning woman of
his courtroom. Mr. Van Cott and Will Ray, who was then United
States District Attorney, both thought the accusation was a frame-
up and urged the judge to meet the thing head on with a fight to
the finish. But the judge resigned from the bench rather than go
through the ordeal of the scandal.120
There may be other instances in which ajudge resigned while under
investigation and may have done so to avoid the embarrassment or
the expense of contesting the charges. In such instances, the truth
of the allegations is left unchallenged, and is thus uncertain.
121
Having said that, it is still possible to conclude that connections
exist between investigations or allegations of misbehavior and
subsequent resignations, even if it is not always possible to assess
the merits of the investigation or allegations. For instance,
Congress investigated Judge William Story of the Western District
of Arkansas in 1874 for, among other things, inordinately large (and
undocumented) court expenditures 122 and for allowing bail to
120 CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, HISTORY OF TERRITORIAL FEDERAL JUDGES FOR THE
TERRITORY OF UTAH 1848-1896 AND UNrrED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH 1896-1978, at 57-58 (1988) (quoting SID N. CORNWALL, THE VAN
COTT FIRM, FIRST CENTURY 37-38 (1974)).
121 Judge Francis Winslow, who resigned during an impeachment investigation,
claimed that he did so because "his usefulness as a member of the judiciary
was... impaired" and that even if exonerated, "the prestige of the court would be
impaired should he return to it." 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 550, at
790-93. He also indicated that the "financial drain of fighting the charges would be
too great." Ex-Judge Winslow of U.S. Bench Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1932, at 19-20.
122 The investigating committee compared expenditures of the entire state for the
three years before the Civil War with expenditures in the Western District for the
three years after its creation in 1871, which corresponded with Story's stewardship
as districtjudge. From 1858 through 1860, the average expenditure per year was
$20,000 for the entire state. Under Story's tenure the expenditures for the Western
District alone averaged more than $241,000 per year. See The Daily Gazette, supra note
55, at 3.
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persons convicted of capital crimes while they were awaiting
sentence.1 23 The House committee found that Judge Story's
testimony was "lame, disconnected and unsatisfactory." 124 Within
the month after publication of the committee investigation and
report in the Arkansas Gazette, Judge Story resigned and moved to
Denver.12 5 He was elected lieutenant governor of Colorado fifteen
years later. 26 A biographical directory of Colorado, published in
1899, implies that the then thirty-two-year-old Story had resigned
from the bench in Arkansas for health reasons. 127 Nevertheless, the
coincidence of the reports of the congressional investigation and
Story's resignation suggests that avoidance of impeachment or
possible criminal prosecution was the most likely motivation for his
resignation.
Judge Story's case, as well as that of some others, raises the
question of whether closer attention to character, background, and
"judicial temperament" during the nominating process might
diminish the number of problem judges on the federal bench. The
average age at appointment ofjudges who resigned after allegations
of misbehavior were made against them was 43.9.128 Judge Story
was twenty-seven when he was appointed; Judge Martin Manton,
whose judicial corruption resulted in his prosecution and a prison
term after he resigned in disgrace in 1939, was thirty-eight when he
was appointed to the bench. 129 Although greater age at appoint-
ment does not in itself have any correlation to greater probity of
appointees, it would ensure that appointees have enough of a





125 See Westem District of Arkansas Judge Caldwell to Fill Stoy's Place Temporarily,
ARK. GAZETTE, June 30, 1874, at 1.
126 See PORTRAIT AND BIoGRAPHcAL REcoRD OF THE STATE OF COLORADO 141
(Chapman Publishing Co. 1899).
V47 See id.
128 See infra app., tbl. 2.
129 See infra app., tbl. 2.
130 The National Commission onjudicial Discipline and Removal recommended
that "FBI full-field investigations of judicial candidates be as comprehensive as
reasonably possible to ensure sound judgments about their integrity and qualifica-
tions." NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDIcIAL DISciPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ONJUDICIAL DIScIPLINE AND REMOVAL 82 (1993) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT].
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Age does not guarantee either competence or good behavior,
however. For example, Judge Mell Underwood of the Southern
District of Ohio, who took senior status for apparently ordinary
reasons, 131 had a number of mandamus cases filed against him
because he was "just not doing much work."13 2 He first respond-
ed to efforts by his circuit council to induce him to retire by digging
in his heels, reportedly saying that "I told them to go to hell."1 3
Nevertheless, he did end up retiring after the chief judge of the
district began supplying reports about his behavior to a statewide
newspaper.1 34 In other cases, advanced age has caused problems
on the bench, though not for the elderlyjudge. For example, Judge
John Warren Davis of the Third Circuit was investigated for writing
and selling decisions over Senior Judge Joseph Buffington's signa-
ture. Buffington was aging, deaf, and nearly blind, and as such,
clearly was not writing the opinions.
13 5
131 He was 73 years old and had served for nearly 30 years.
1 32 PETER G. FISH, THE PoLrncs OF FEDERALJUDICiAL ADMINISTRATION 412, 416
(1973).
13 3 Id.
134 Other chiefjudges have used the newspapers to good effect for the modifica-
tion ofjudicial behavior. Judge William Campbell, for instance, related his techniques
for dealing with backlogs created byjudges: "One or two of [the judges] were a bit
lazier than the others and I incurred their ill will by reporting that at the end of the
year to the press. I never had to report it more than once." Oral History Interview
withJudge WilliamJ. Campbell, in Washington, D.C. 48 (Aug. 16-18,1982) (transcript
on file with FederalJudicial History Office, FederalJudicial Center). Wheeler and
Levin report other, similarly informal disciplinary techniques in their 1979 study of
judicial discipline and removal. See WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 7, at 13. The
example they relate is of a chiefjudge who had a temporary problem with ajudge:
"'I called him up,' explained the judge, 'and I said, "You are temporarily assigned to
a certain place,"' and he said 'Court is never held there,' and I said 'That is why.'"
Id. (quoting ChiefJudge Richard H. Chambers of the Ninth Circuit in Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the SenateJudiciary Comm. on S. 3055,3060-62, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 249
(1968)). For an in-depth study of informal disciplinary mechanisms, see Geyh, supra
note 42, at 243.
135 See BORKIN, supra note 14, at 101. A special court sitting by designation of
Chief Justice Vinson found that at least five cases were issued under Judge
Buffington's name but were actually written byJudge Davis. See Root Refining Co.
v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 532 (3d Cir. 1948).
The court designated by Chief'Justice Vinson to review another of the spurious
Buffington/Davis opinions was asked to determine "whetherJudge Buffington, by
virtue of his physical condition in 1938 and his reliance upon Judge Davis, was
disqualified from participation in the appeal in this case." Id. at 535-36. By vacating
its judgment and ordering the district court to do the same, the court avoided
answering that question. See id. at 541.
Judge Davis's actions came to light in 1939 when he himself took senior status.
See BOaxIN, supra note 14, at 116. It is not clear whether he expected his retirement
to forestall further action; if he did, he was mistaken. Formal congressional impeach-
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B. Investigations
1. Congressional Investigations
a. Changing Roles of Congressional Investigations
Congressional investigations, initiated as precursors to impeach-
ment proceedings, have frequently triggered judicial resignations.
The House has engaged in more than fifty judicial investigations
since 1789, resulting in thirteen resignations, four convictions, four
acquittals, and five censures.1 36 Presently, there are concerns
about the number of recentjudicial prosecutions that have occurred
without congressional investigations.1- 7 Knowing how congressio-
nal behavior has changed over time may offer insights into the
nature of the problem.
138
Although the absolute number of House investigations of Article
Ill judges has not changed significantly over the decades, the
percentages have. As with departures, the highest percentage of
investigations occurred during the judiciary's infancy. Over the
course of the first decade of the nineteenth century, Congress
investigated four Article III judges.1 9 The average size of the
judiciary was twenty-four, so Congress investigated 13% of the
judgeships during that decade. The four investigations in the 1820s
equaled 11%, which was the second highest rate for the period
studied.
140
After the 1820s, the investigation rate fluctuated from 0% to
5.5% for the rest of the nineteenth century, with the notable
exception of the 1870s, when Congress investigated eight judges,
ment processes were not begun until after his retirement and were not abandoned
until after he relinquished his pension rights. See id. at 120.156 See infra app., tbl. 1. These figures do not include territorial judges orjudges
who have traditionally been listed as resigned, where new evidence shows that they
did not resign. They also do not include the recently impeached judges, who were
not subjects of congressional investigation prior to their prosecutions by the Justice
Department.
Ts7 See Grimes, supra note 2, at 1216-18.
138 For an assessment of changing congressional behavior regarding investigations
that includes territorial as well as Article Mi judges, see id. at 1215-16.
139 They werejudges Chase, Innis, Peters, and Pickering. See BomUN, supra note
14, at 226-27, 234-35, 242-43..
140 The investigations during the 1820s were ofJudges Conkling, Tait, Thurston,
and Peck. See BORKIN, supra note 14, at 248-49 (describing the proceedings against
Tait); 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTs,supra note 14, §§ 2364-84, at 772-804, §§ 2491-92, at 998-
91 (describing the proceedings against Conkling, Peck, and Thurston).
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11% of the seventy judgeships that the decade averaged. 141 Of the
eight judges who were investigated, all were appointed between
1863 and 1871.142 Lincoln appointed four, Johnson one, and Grant
the remaining three. 143 The six whose political affiliation is known
were all Republicans, and were investigated at a time when both
Congress and the executive branch were controlled by the Republi-
can party.144 Although animosity between branches figured promi-
nently in the impeachment of President Johnson in 1868 and in the
investigation of Justice Field that same year,145 the party affiliation
of the investigated judges suggests that partisan animosity was
probably not the motivating factor behind this abnormally large
number of investigations.
During the twentieth century, the investigation rate has never
climbed above 4%, although in the 1930s the 3.33% rate represented
seven investigations, one shy of the record eight investigations of
the 1870s. From 1900 to 1910, there were no congressional
investigations, although during this time Congress apparently
requested that the Justice Department conduct several investiga-
tions.146  From 1910 to 1920, Congress investigated 4% of the
judiciary. 147 This percentage dropped to 0.5% in the 1940s and 0%
in the 1950s and 1960s, and it went up to 0.2% in the 1970s.
t48
b. The Reasons for Investigations
In 1796, the year of the earliest recorded investigation of a
federal judge, the House requested the opinion of Attorney General
Charles Lee on the best method of proceeding against Ohio
Territorial Judge George Turner 149 after receiving a petition
141 See VAN TASSEL, supra note 14, at 29. They were Judges Henry Blodgett,
Richard Busteed, Mark Delahay, Edward Durell, David Humphreys, Charles Sherman,




145 See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
146 See infra part II.B.2.
147 See VAN TASSEL, supra note 14, at 29-30.
148 See id.
149 See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2486, at 982-83. Judge Turner's
case is of interest because it arose during a period when Congress still treated
territorial judges in the same manner as Article III judges for the purposes of
removal. Territorial judges serve for limited terms, are not Article IlIjudges, and
may be removed by the President. Territorialjudges were the subject of a number
of House investigations until the Supreme Court ruled in 1828 that territorial courts
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complaining of Turner's behavior. Because of the expense of
conducting an impeachment of a judge so far from the seat of
government, Lee suggested that Judge Turner be prosecuted by
"information on indictment before the Supreme Court of that
territory which is competent to the trial." 150  He informed the
House that
in consequence of affidavits stating complaints against Judge
Turner, of oppression and gross violations of private property,
under color of his office, which have been lately transmitted to the
President of the United States, the Secretary of State has been by
him instructed to give orders to Governor St. Clair to take the
necessary measures for bringing that officer to a fair trial,
respecting those charges, before the court of that Territory
151
The House then set aside its own investigation. Although Judge
Turner requested that the House investigate the charges against
him, the investigating committee reported that his case should be
heard before the court of the territory, where Turner would have
the opportunity to defend himself.
152
During the first decade of the nineteenth century, the investiga-
tions and impeachment proceedings were a direct result of partisan
politics. 153 ThroughoutJefferson's administration and beyond, the
Jeffersonian Democrats launched repeated attacks on the judicia-
ry.154 Henry Adams reports in his history of Jefferson's second
administration that Senator Tiffin of Ohio proposed an amendment
to the Constitution in 1807 that would have changed judicial tenure
from a lifetime office to one held for a specified number of
years. 15 5  Senator Tiffin's proposal allowed removal by
are legislative, not constitutional courts. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 511, 545 (1828). The House Judiciary Committee concluded in 1833 that a
territorialjudge "is not a proper subject of trial by impeachment" because territorial
judges are not "civil officers for the purposes of Article U, § 4 of the Constitution."
3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2493, at 991. Territorialjudges have not been
included in the statistics for this study.
150 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2486, at 982-83.
151 Id. at 983.
152 See id.
153 See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THEJEFFERSONiAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLmCS IN THE
YOUNG REPUBLIC 69 (1971).
154 See id. at 69-82.
155 
See 4 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF THOMASJEFFERSON 205 (Antiquarian Press 1962) (1896).
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the President upon address of two-thirds of both houses of Con-
gress.156 Adams tells us that Tiffin's motion
was not an isolated or personal act. The State legislatures were
invoked. Vermont adopted the amendment. The House of
Delegates in Virginia, both branches of the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture, the popular branch in Tennessee, and various other State
governments, in whole or in part, adopted the principle and urged
it upon Congress. In the House, George W. Campbell moved a
similar amendment January 30, and from time to time other
senators and members made attempts to bring the subject
forward. 157
That same year, Joseph Story listened, appalled, as another senator
attacked the judiciary. 158  Story later exclaimed: "Never did I
hear such all-unhinging and terrible doctrines. He laid the axe at
the root of judicial power, and every stroke might be distinctly
felt."159 Between 1807 and 1812, nine judicial-removal amend-
ments were proposed in Congress.160  After the fervor of anti-
judiciary sentiment subsided, the nineteenth century saw only four
other such proposals.
16 1
During the 1870s, when Congress most actively investigated
federal judges, the entire Grant administration was reeling from
disclosure of massive corruption at the cabinet level. The Credit
Mobilier scandal went hand in glove with exposure of malfeasance
by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Navy, the At-
torney General, and the Postmaster General. William Belknap, the
Secretary of War, resigned in 1876 but was nevertheless impeached.






159 Id. at 206.
160 See HERMAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 150 (Burt Franklin
1896).
161 See id. at 150-51. An 1822 proposal would have made "United States judges
removable by the President on thejoint address of both Houses of Congress." Id. at
149-50. In 1837, an amendment was proposed which "provided for the removal of
any judge of the Federal Courts whenever the President and two-thirds of Congress
should consider that such action would promote the public good." Id. at 150. In
1849, an amendment proposed that "whenever a majority of the members of each
branch of Congress should concur in an address to the President for the removal of
any judge, his office should be vacant from the day of the delivery of such address."
Id. at 151. An 1867 proposal raised the threshold from a simple majority to two-
thirds of both the House and Senate. See id.162 SeeJOHN BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 370-71 (1963); BUSHNELL,
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In the 1920s, the Harding administration was similarly rocked
by the Teapot Dome scandal. 163 Improprieties in the Justice
Department, the Veterans Bureau, and the Interior Department
resulted in suicides, resignations, and the first prison term for a
cabinet officer in American history.164 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who averred, "I don't follow politics," was nevertheless
moved to comment that "we are investigating everybody and I dare
say fostering a belief too readily accepted that public men generally
are corrupt."165  That belief seems not to have been widely
shared: the New York newspapers found the scandal of so little
concern that they dubbed senators investigating the affair "scandal-
mongers," "mudgunners," and "assassins of character."16 6 This
was the atmosphere of public life that preceded the next major
exposure of judicial venality in the 1930s.
167
The declining number of House investigations after the 1930s
probably indicates more about changes in Congress than it does
about changes in the judiciary. Beginning in the 1930s, Congress
seemed more willing to entrust the Justice Department and the
criminal court system with judicial discipline.168  During the
communist witch hunts of the 1950s, Congress did not conduct any
formal investigations of Article IIIjudges. This may not mean that
judges were more upstanding in the 1950s than at other times, but
simply that an institution with significant time constraints had other
fish to fry.
c. Frontal Assaults on Judicial Independence or Constitutional
Exercises: The Field, Watrous, and Ritter Proceedings
Justice Stephen Field was at the center of a controversy early in
his career; a controversy that he perceived as a direct attack by
Congress onjudicial independence. In 1867 and 1868, the Supreme
supra note 8, at 165-89 (discussing the impeachment of Belknap).163 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-32, at 93
(1966).
164 See id. at 90-94.
165 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 6,
1924), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 132 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941).
166 LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 163, at 94.
16 7 See generally BORKIN, supra note 14 (detailing the corrupt activities ofJudges
Martin T. Manton,J. Warren Davis, and Albert W.Johnson in the 1930s and 1940s).
168 See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 2, at 1216 (discussing the development ofalternate
methods ofjudicial discipline in the 1930s, including"criminal prosecutions of sitting
federal judges and internal measures taken by the judiciary itself").
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Court was asked on several occasions to consider the constitutional-
ity of the Reconstruction Acts passed in the aftermath of the Civil
War.16 9 Field, suspected of harboring hostility towards the Acts,
was subjected to what he took to be an attempt to influence his
decision and chill the independence of the other justices, as evi-
denced by a bungled attempt to impeach him.
170
As Field told it, he was invited to a dinner party that began at
about five in the afternoon. By eight, Field was ready to retire and
left. Shortly thereafter, Rodman Price, the former governor of New
Jersey, arrived and was told to take Field's place at the table. In the
course of subsequent conversation, Price expressed the opinion that
"the whole reconstruction measures would soon be 'smashed up'
and sent to 'kingdom come' by the Supreme Court."171 A report-
er overheard, and immediately asked a waiter for the identity of the
speaker; of course, the place card bore Justice Field's name. The
comment appeared in the next day's paper, attributed only to a
Justice of the Supreme Court. When the story was reprinted by a
Baltimore paper, Field was identified as the Justice in question. On
January 30, 1868, Republican Representative Glenni W. Scofield of
Pennsylvania, introduced a resolution in the House directing the
Judiciary Committee to determine whether the reported facts
justified an impeachment. 172 The resolution passed by a vote of
ninety-seven to fifty-four.
178
The facts became known soon enough, and the resolution was
tabled in June.174 But Field saw the action as something more
than the innocent error that the incident initially suggests. The
conflict between Congress and the other two branches of govern-
ment was at its peak when Scofield introduced his resolution. In
December of 1867, the House Judiciary Committee had recom-
mended the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.
175
Although the House declined to impeach at that time, less than
169 See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Georgia v. Stanton,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). For
an account of the showdown between the Court and Congress over Reconstruction,
see 1 WARREN, supra note 51, at 455-97.
170 See CARL B. SWISHER, STEPHENJ. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 163 (1930).
171 Id. at 162 (quoting STEPHNJ. FIELD, PERSONAL REMINiSCENCES OF EARLY DAYS
IN CAUFORNIA 174-79 (1893)).
172 See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2503, at 1008 (recounting the
House's actions in response to the newspaper article).
17- See SWISHER, supra note 170, at 163.
174 See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2503, at 1008.
175 See BUSHNELL, supra note 8, at 135.
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three months later Johnson's hostile actions toward Congress and
the Reconstruction Acts prompted enough congressmen to shift
position for the House to impeach. 176  In January the House
Judiciary Committee had also reported a bill intended to restrict the
Court's ability to find the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional.
177
Conservative Republican Gideon Welles referred to the situation as
Congress's "war upon the Court."1 78 In March the war escalated
with the passage of an amendment to an appropriations bill which
repealed the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and prohibited the Court from
exercising jurisdiction on any appeals already taken.
179
Newspaper commentary of the time expressed the extreme
congressional distrust of the Supreme Court. For instance, The
Independent informed its readers that "[t]his Congress will not brook
opposition from the Court in political matters. The safety of the
Nation demands the Congressional Reconstruction shall be
successful; and if the Court interferes, the Court will go to the
wall."180 Representative Robert Schenck of Ohio, who had been
responsible for the Amendment repealing the Court's Habeas
Corpus Act jurisdiction, declared "I hold it to be not only my right,
but my duty as a Representative of the people, to clip the wings of
that Court."
18 1
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising thatJustice Field
interpreted the impeachment resolution as a sinister act aimed at
undermining the independence not only of Field himself, but of the
entire Supreme Court.182 "The resolution was evidently intended
to intimidate me," fumed Field, "and to act as a warning to all the
judges as to what they might expect if they presumed to question
the wisdom or the validity of the reconstruction measures of
176 See id. at 135-37.
177 The bill provided that in order to hold a law of Congress invalid, two-thirds of
the justices had to concur. See 2 WARREN, supra note 51, at 465-67.
178 Id. at 471.
179 See Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44,44 ("An act to amend the Judiciary Act
.");Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (1845) ("An act to establish the judicial
Courts of the United States."). This rider amendment was aimed directly at Exparte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wal.) 506 (1869), which the Court had consented to hear in
February, and which many feared would be the vehicle the Court would use to
overthrow the Reconstruction Acts. See ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON,
THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 483 (4th ed. 1970).
'80 1 WARREN, supra note 51, at 477.
181 Id. at 475.
182 See SWISHER, supra note 170, at 160-63.
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Congress."183 Although unsuccessful in this regard, if such intimi-
dation had even been the intention, this incident highlights the ways
in which disciplinary measures directed against an individual judge
may create an atmosphere that is not conducive to the full exercise
of judicial independence by other members of the judiciary.
Similarly, Judge John Watrous, the first district judge for the
District of Texas, faced a number of politically and financially
motivated ouster attempts that he interpreted as a frontal assault on
judicial independence.18 4 After the House voted not to impeach
Judge Watrous in 1858,185 Senator Sam Houston denounced him
on the Senate floor as part of a publicity campaign to turn Texas
public opinion against Watrous and pave the way for another
impeachment attempt,1 86 an effort in which Watrous's enemies
were, at least in some measure, successful.1 8 7 On the occasion of
this latest of numerous attacks, Judge Watrous decided to reply in
a printed pamphlet, in which he stated: "If I am driven from the
bench by such methods of annoyance, then have we reached the
beginning of the end of anything like independence of the judicia-
ry.... [Judges would be forced to] consult the popular cry and not
the law."188 Watrous's remonstrances fell on deaf ears in the
House Judiciary Committee, though he found his audience in the
full House: for the fourth time, the House refused to impeach the
controversial judge.
1 8 9
Although both Justice Field and Judge Watrous survived ouster
attempts that they interpreted as direct attacks on judicial indepen-
dence, Judge Halsted Ritter was removed from office in 1936 under
circumstances which suggested to some that "the Senate's decision
had been designed to intimidate the Supreme Court." g° As in
the late 1860s, the Court and Congress were at odds-this time over
the constitutionality of the legislative apparatus of the New
183 Id. at 163.
184 See WALACE HAwKINS, THE CASE OFJOHN C. WATROUS, UNITED STATESJUDGE
FOR TExAS: A POLITICAL STORY OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 51-53 (1950)
(describing efforts to turn public opinion against Watrous).
185 See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2498, at 1003.
186 See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1858).
187 Although the full House failed to act on the resolution, the Judiciary
Committee submitted a report that concluded with a resolution to impeach. See 3
HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 2499, at 1004.
188 HAWINS, supra note 184, at 53.
189 See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, §§ 2495-99, at 994-1004 (detailing the
different impeachment proceedings against Watrous between 1852 and 1860).
190 BUSHNELL, supra note 8, at 286.
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Deal. 19 1 Indeed, the charges against Ritter have been described
as "flimsy and poorly developed." 192 In addition, his impeach-
ment trial did not take place until six or seven years after his alleged
misconduct, without any further complaints or allegations during
the intervening years. 193  Of the seven charges made against
Ritter, the Senate was unable to muster a guilty verdict on any of
the six specific counts, and convicted only on the final count which
combined the previous six. 194 Jacobus ten Broeck suggested that
due to the timing of Ritter's impeachment, and "its possible
connection with the New Deal attack upon the judiciary, its bearing
on the question of feasibility of impeachment as a method of
influencing or controlling the judicial department is more immedi-
ate and impressive than any of the earlier cases." 195 Eleanore
Bushnell speculates that "[b]ecause the House of Representatives
had already investigated him in 1933, perhaps Judge Ritter's
impeachment emerged as a ready-made and quick route for showing
the judicial branch that Congress possessed, and would use, power
to chasten it."196
The assertion that the Ritter impeachment is an example of
congressional use of the impeachment power to intimidate a
politically uncooperative judiciary is inconclusive. Nonetheless,
along with the Field and Watrous cases it is illustrative of the
potential for Congress to use investigation and impeachment as a
device for exerting improper control over the judicial department.
This possibility weighs against reducing the burden and visibility of
the impeachment process by transferring it to a less political body
such as the judiciary. The impeachment process has been recog-
nized as a political (as opposed to judicial) process since the
founding of the Republic. 197 Impeachments, then, ought to be
conducted under circumstances that allow for political redress,
especially if they are used for improper purposes such as attempts
to compromise judicial independence.
198
191 For a list of the New Deal measures over turned by the Supreme Court
between the time Ritter was first brought to the attention of the House, and his trial
in 1936, see ten Broeck, supra note 58, at 202 & nn.76-83.
192 BUSHNELL, supra note 8, at 285.
193 See id.
194 See id. at 282.
195 ten Broeck, supra note 58, at 198-99.
196 BUSHNELL, supra note 8, at 286.
197 See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735-40 (1993) (holding that
impeachment procedures present a nonjusticiable political question); THE FEDERALIST
No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
198 1 am speaking here only ofjudicial removals; I do not go so far as some and
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2. Department of Justice Investigations
Though it is clear that congressional prosecutions or threats of
prosecutions could have an adverse affect onjudicial independence,
it is less clear whether executive branch investigations or threats of
investigations have a similar effect. As the following examples
indicate, since the time of Judge Turner, varying opinions have been
expressed on the subject of the authority of the executive to
investigate federal judges. These opinions have at times been
explicitly expressed in Justice Department testimony to Congress
and at other times implicitly avowed through the investigative
activities of the Justice Department. The investigations that have
led to prosecution or impeachment are well known. 199 Investiga-
tions that have not resulted in further action against a judge or
judges are less visible. Because such investigations have seldom
come to public attention, assessing their propriety and impact is
much more difficult.
An incident occurring in the early 1920s, in which an assistant
U.S. attorney was dismissed for launching an investigation of a
judge without authorization, suggests that the Justice Department
recognized that it is dangerous to treat the investigation of judges
the same way as any other investigation. Assistant Attorney General
Rush L. Holland testified before a House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee that
we recently discharged an employee who, without authority or
suggestion, on his own motion, proceeded to investigate a United
States judge. We discharged him by reason of the fact that we are
not attempting to exercise espionage or jurisdiction over judges.
That rests wholly with the Congress, and the Attorney General
himself could not issue an order to do a thing of that kind, except
when called upon by Congress so to do.2 ° °
conclude that discipline short of impeachment and removal should likewise not be
entrusted to less visible and politically accountable bodies, such as the Judicial
Councils under the 1980 Act. For an exposition of the arguments against having any
disciplinary process short of impeachment and against placing such processes in any
body other than Congress, see Edwards, supra note 23, at 775-93.
199 See, e.g., BORMiN, supra note 14, at 23-186; Grimes, supra note 2, at 1216-19.
Bushnell provides three instances ofJustice Department investigations ofjudges. See
BUSHNELL, supra note 8, at 290-91, 308, 314 (outlining the investigations ofJudges
Harz. Claiborne, Alcee Hastings, and Walter Nixon, Jr.).
2 Hearings Before Subcomm. of House Comm. on Appropriations, Departments of State
and Jnstice Appropriation Bil4 1923, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 163 (1922)
[hereinafterJustice Department Hearings] (testimony of Rush L. Holland, Assistant
Attorney General of the United States).
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A few years earlier, in 1913, Attorney General James McReynolds
reported to Congress that although
[n]o inspectors or other agents are appointed or employed by the
Attorney General or by the Department of Justice specifically to
investigate and report upon the conduct or proceedings of any of
the courts or judges of the United States .... [w]ithin the past five
years agents of the department have investigated the conduct of
three judges of courts of the United States appointed under the
Constitution to hold office during good behavior ... 201
Among those investigated was Judge Robert Archbald, whom
Congress subsequently impeached and convicted.20 2 McReynolds
indicated that although the President did not possess the power to
remove Article IIIjudges, "it seems clearly within his prerogative to
inform the House of Representatives of facts which might necessi-
tate a further investigation or an impeachment."2 03 Professor
Peter Fish suggests that the Justice Department perceived investiga-
tons as a potent weapon in influencing how judges did their job,
noting that "[w]hatever their intrinsic value, investigations afforded
or were perceived as affording the prosecuting department immense
leverage in its relations with the judges."20 4 Professor Fish quotes
Senator William E. Borah's comment that "[in different ways and
by different methods other than by the usual practice judges are
given to understand the views of the Government as to what the law
is and what the decision should be."
20 5
After Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia preferred charges against
Tennessee District Court Judge Harry B. Anderson in March of
201 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORTS ON COURTS AND
JUDGES: LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, S. DOC. No. 156, 63d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1913) [hereinafter COURTS ANDJUDGES] (quoting a letter fromJames C.
McReynolds, Attorney General of the United States to the President of the U.S.
Senate (Aug. 6, 1913)). McReynolds did not address the issue of whether theJustice
Department could legitimately investigate judges with a view toward criminal
prosecution rather than impeachment, but the dear implication of his letter was that
such an option was not even on the table at that time. See id.
202 According to the testimony elicited at hearings before House of Representa-
tives, both Judge Archbald and Judge Swayne (who had been impeached and
acquitted in 1905) were investigated by the Justice Department at the request of
Congress. SeeJustice Department Hearings, supra note 200, at 181 (testimony ofJohn
D. Harris, Chief of the Division of Accounts of the Justice Department). The clear
implication of McReynolds's testimony, however, is that the executive branch
instigated the Archbald investigation.
u0§3COURTS AND JUDGES, supra note 201, at 3.
204 FISH, supra note 132, at 103.
205 Id.
RESIGNATIONS AND REMOVALS
1930,206 Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee accused the
Justice Department of having used its investigatory powers in an at-
tempt to intimidate the Tennessee judge.20 7 He told Attorney
General William Mitchell that he had evidence of a report made by
one of Mitchell's assistants, in which the assistant "recommended
that you call Judge Anderson before you and tell him that unless he
changed his rulings in liquor cases and in matters of procedure that
an investigation looking to his impeachment should be immediately
begun." 208  Attorney General Mitchell responded by stating
unequivocally that "[i]t is clear that Attorneys General have no
authority to make investigation [sic] with a view to impeachment of
Federal judges, and, so far as I know, no Attorney General has
claimed any such authority."209 He then went on to deny that he
had ever received the report that McKellar referred to.210 He did
indicate, however, that the investigation, which he characterized as
an investigation of the administration of bankruptcy laws, was being
carried out on the department's own initiative, and that, although
Judge Anderson was not the subject of the investigation, "during the
course of the investigations of departmental agents ... persons at
Memphis, on their own motion, went to the agents of the depart-
ment and laid before them statements relating to Judge Anderson's
official conduct."211 The Attorney General indicated that the
agents had then properly recorded and transmitted these statements
to the Justice Department.212 He denied as well that the Justice
Department had made the report of the investigation available to
Congressman LaGuardia. 213 Senator McKellar was not mollified,
and he informed the Senate that he had brought the matter to their
attention
so that Senators would think over the proposition of whether it is
in the province of the Department of Justice to put sleuths on
Federal judges and have secret reports made concerning Federal
judges in this country.... If a Federal judge feels that he is under
206 See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, § 542, at 776-77.
207 See 72 CONG. REC. 10,881 (1930) (statement of Sen. Kenneth McKellar).
208 Id.
29 Id. at 10,882 (quoting a letter from William Mitchell, Attorney General of the
United States to Sen. Kenneth McKellar). But cf supra text accompanying note 201
(quoting Attorney General McReynolds and implying that the opposite is true).
210 See 72 CONG. REC. at 10,882.
211 id.
212 See id.213 See id.
1993]
382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 333
constant scrutiny of the Department ofJustice, I do not know that
he can make a fair and upright and honest judge. Nor do I think
the department, while admitting it has no authority to investigate
judges looking to their impeachment, should actually exercise such
authority under some other pretense.
214
In the early 1960s, the judges of the Fourth Circuit indicated by
their actions their belief that it was appropriate to go directly to the
Department of Justice with a request for an investigation of'judicial
behavior without first informing Congress. Chief Judge Simon
Sobelof wrote to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, indicating that
he was sending on
the file of correspondence passing between our court and counsel
for the Textile Workers Union of America and Deering Milliken
Corporation following the argument of an appeal in our court.
Inasmuch as this relates to alleged conduct of one of our col-
leagues, we think it appropriate to pass the file on to the Depart-
ment ofJustice.
215
The Fourth Circuit had itself already conducted an investigation and
concluded that the judge in question, Clement Haynsworth, was not
guilty of the ethical lapse or possible bribery complained of.
216
The appeal to the Justice Department for an investigation was
apparently made to clear Haynsworth's name, and the Justice
Department may have seemed a better institution to achieve that
end than the House Judiciary Committee.
Ignoring the policies underlying the separation of powers, if not
the explicit constitutional mandates vesting exclusive impeachment
power in Congress,2 17 can sometimes undermine public trust in
the judiciary in two directions, depending on the political relation-
ships between the judges and the other two branches. When the
President is a member of one party and the judge being investigated
is of another, clear issues of partisan pressure surface. On the other
214 Id. at 10,883. The House determined that impeachment was not warranted,
but censured Judge Anderson. See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 14, §§ 542,
at 776-77, § 551, at 793 (summarizing the inquiry into Judge Anderson's conduct).
215 Hearings on the Nomination of Clement Haynsworth to Be an AssociateJustice of the
Supreme Court, in 10 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES BY THE SENATEJUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1975, at 4 (Roy M. Mersky &J.
MyronJacobstein eds., 1977) (reprinting a letter from Simon Sobelof, ChiefJudge of
the Fourth Circuit, to Robert Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States (Feb.
18, 1964)).
216 See id. at 2-34.
217 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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hand, when the judge and the President are of the same party, and
questions about the judge's integrity are raised but not pursued,
equally disturbing questions may arise. Both circumstances expose
threats not only to the reality of judicial independence, but no less
importantly to the public perception ofjudicial independence. The
circumstances surrounding the resignation of Supreme CourtJustice
Abe Fortas in 1969 provide an interesting example of both sides of
the partisan coin.
After Associate Justice Fortas's failed nomination to be Chief
Justice in 1968,218 questions began surfacing about his relation-
ship to financier Louis Wolfson, who had recently been convicted
of conspiracy to violate the securities laws.219 In September of
1968, the SenateJudiciary Committee received an anonymous letter
advising them to investigate Fortas's relationship with Wolfson.
220
Senator Robert Griffin of Michigan, who had led the earlier fight
against Fortas, sought FBI assistance in investigating the mat-
ter.221 Senator Griffin's representative was told that an investiga-
tion could be done only with the approval of Attorney General
Ramsey Clark. In response, Griffin's representative observed that
the Senator would not pursue the matter because "the Attorney
General had fully endorsed Fortas and would not authorize the FBI
to conduct [an] investigation along lines which might seek to
discredit him."
222
When President Johnson told Ramsey Clark in June that he
wanted to elevate Fortas to the Chief Justiceship, Clark was not
happy about the prospect of investigating Fortas again.
223
Fortas's biographer, Professor Bruce Murphy, reports that Clark was
genuinely concerned about the
"danger" to the constitutional "separation of powers" in a member
of the executive branch saying to a sitting, and presumably
independent,judge, "Okay, now, are you an honorable man? Have
218 Fortas, a Democrat, was nominated by President Lyndon Johnson (also a
Democrat) to be ChiefJustice. His nomination was defeated by the SenateJudiciary
Committee.
219 See William Lambert, Fortas of the Supreme Court: A Question of Ethics, LIFE, May
9, 1969, at 32, 32-37.2 20 See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOcRAPHY 360 (1990).
221 See id. at 331-33, 337.
Id. (quoting a letter from Carla DeLoach to Clyde Tolson (Sept. 23, 1968)).
22 See BRUCE MURPHY, FoRTAs: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURTJUSTICE
284 (1988).
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you done anything dishonest? Have you taken bribes, or have you
done things foolish?"
224
Professor Murphy found no evidence that an FBI investigation was
initiated.
225
A few months later, however, the administration had changed
with the election of Republican Richard Nixon. Life magazine
reporter William Lambert was also attempting to investigate the
relationship between Fortas and Wolfson, and he was now dealing
with aJustice Department more openly hostile to Fortas. Lambert
met with Will Wilson, the assistant attorney general in charge of the
Justice Department's criminal division. He sought, in that meeting
and later, to get Justice Department corroboration of a tip he had
received about Fortas's possible financial improprieties. Wilson,
who was no fan of Lyndon Johnson's and a critic of the Warren
Court, declared later, "I knew what kind of a potential coup we had.
In all candor, we wanted Fortas off the Court."2 26  Wilson
launched his own investigation of the Justice's activities, "making
the matter a top priority for the Justice Department."227 He in-
formed Attorney GeneralJohn Mitchell andJ. Edgar Hoover of the
FBI of the connection between Fortas and Wolfson. Mitchell passed
the information along to President Nixon.
228
In an interview with Bruce Murphy in 1982, Wilson confirmed
the complicity of the Nixon administration in the production of the
damaging article about Fortas that was suspected at the time:
Lambert returned to the office of a seniorJustice Department
official and told him that he still needed confirmation of the story.
When assistance was not immediately forthcoming, the reporter
pressed: "I will not run the story unless I have confirmation of it."
So, even though Justice Department files about an ongoing
investigation are confidential, the official confirmed the story.
This was all that Lambert needed to proceed.
229
Murphy concludes: "With that, the Nixon Justice Department had
now become an accomplice in the production of the story."
23 0
224 Id. (quoting comments by Ramsey Clark, recorded in the Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library).
225 See id. at 638 n.55.
226 Id. at 551.
227 Id.
228 See KALMAN, supra note 220, at 362.
229 MUP'HY, supra note 223, at 555.
230 Id.
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After the Life magazine story broke questioning Fortas's dealings
with Wolfson, 231 President Nixon met with Republican members
of Congress to persuade them that impeachment proceedings
against Fortas would be inadvisable, since they would only divide the
country. Every indication was that Fortas could be forced to resign
without impeachment. Attorney General Mitchell arranged to meet
with ChiefJustice Earl Warren to persuade him to apply pressure on
Fortas to resign. After the meeting, Warren remarked to his sec-
retary, "He can't stay."23 2 Fortas later said he "had received a
message from the Nixon administration that if he did not resign, it
would institute criminal proceedings against him."233  Fortas
resigned. A month after Fortas's resignation, Senator Strom
Thurmond declared "Douglas is next."
234
In a relatively recent instance ofjudicial recalcitrance in the face
of requests for resignation, Judge Herbert Fogel of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania remained in office for more than a year
after he was investigated in 1976 by the Justice Department for busi-
ness irregularities occurring before he ascended to the bench.
2 35
Judge Fogel invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned before
a grand jury about his role in a questionable government contract
deal involving his uncle.236  The New York Times reported in
November of 1976 that "Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler,
Jr. has let it be known to Judge Fogel that it would be best for the
reputation of the Federal judiciary if he left the bench voluntari-
ly."25 7 Judge Fogel resigned about a year later and returned to
private practice.
238
The same year, the Department of Justice was also investigating
JudgeJohn Singleton in Texas, but the Department's efforts to force
Singleton to resign were unsuccessful, and a grand jury refused to
231 See Lambert, supra note 219, at 32.
212 KALMAN, supra note 220, at 368.
233 Id. at 374-75. Although impeachment proceedings were never fully pursued
against Justice Fortas, Congressman H.R. Gross of Iowa did prepare articles of
impeachment. See id. at 372.
4 Id. at 374 (quoting a press release from Sen. Thurmond's office datedJune 2,
1969).
235 See Nicholas Gage, U.S. Reportedly Asks Resignation ofJudge, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
11, 1976, at 19; Ronald Kessler, GSA Favored Senator's Friend in Lease: Pa. Senator's
Friend Got GSA Lease Despite Lower Bids, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1978, at Al.
236 See Kessler, supra note 235, at Al.
237 Gage, supra note 235, at 19.
238 See Grimes, supra note 2, at 1218 & n.53 (noting thatJudge Fogel resigned
after the Justice Department threatened to prosecute him).
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indict. A journalistic account published in 1980 describes the
incident:
In 1976, a Department of Justice investigation turned up large
personal loans to Judge Singleton in the records of Houston's now
defunct Franklin Bank. At that time, Judge Singleton was
presiding over the criminal prosecution of James Robert Lyne,
former president of the bank.
In 1977Judge Singleton informed his fellow judges that he was
being investigated by a federal grand jury in Houston and that he
had been asked to resign. Singleton said his problems had arisen
out of his getting heavily into debt .... Not only had Judge
Singleton not removed himself from the Lyne case, but the Justice
Department listed a total of 18 cases in which it thought the judge
had a conflict of interest. The grand jury, however, did not indict
Singleton .... 239
The Singleton case highlights the appearance problem that
arises when the Department investigates ajudge before whom it has
appeared as a party in interest. Thejournalists who reported on the
investigation of Judge Singleton pointed out that "Singleton's
rulings have often angered Justice Department officials .... Is the
judge the target of a vendetta by unknown Justice officials who
simply resent his liberal (by Texas standards) record?"
2 40
There is also evidence that, on occasion, individual U.S.
attorneys have initiated investigations or charges against federal
judges, although with little success and sometimes dire, but
predictable, results. In the case of West Virginia District Judge
William Baker, the complaints lodged by the U.S. attorney prompt-
ed Congress to launch an impeachment investigation, after which
Baker was exonerated. 24 1 Chief Justice Taft was outraged by this
intrusion and attempted to get the Judicial Conference to adopt a
resolution supporting the replacement of the U.S. attorney.
242
The acrimony between Judge Baker and the U.S. attorney had
apparently "paralyzed judicial business in the district."
243
239 Clark Mollenhoff & Greg Rushford, Judges Who Should Not Judge, REAIER'S
DiG., Feb. 1980, at 39, 44, reprinted in judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80, Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of
the House Comm. on theJudiciaty, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 473 (1980).
240 Clark Mollenhoff & Greg Rushford, What Can Be Done About UnfitJudges?,
WASH. POsT, Apr. 23, 1978, at 13.






Threats to investigate or launch charges have not always had the
desired result. Judge Peter Grosscup of the Seventh Circuit
announced in 1911 that he wanted to leave the bench to become
more active in politics. The newspaper story about Grosscup's in-
tentions also revealed, however, that Grosscup had been shadowed
for the previous two years by a private detective for a muckraking
magazine. Former U.S. Solicitor General Charles Aldrich an-
nounced that he had supplied information for the magazine's
investigation, and charged that Grosscup was resigning because of
what the magazine had uncovered. Grosscup responded by
declaring that he would withdraw his resignation if formal charges
were made against him. The magazines publisher backed down,
asserting that he wished to do nothing that might stand in the way
of Judge Grosscup's resignation. As the Seventh Circuit's historian
puts it: "The judge resigned October 23, 1911, with the allegations
of malfeasance never having been formally made or proven-yet not
disproven."244 It may be that Grosscup's initial decision to resign
was motivated by the magazine's informal investigation, but his
threat to revoke his resignation suggests that formal charges might
have caused him to stand his ground and fight.
It is clear that many resignations have followed from the use or
threats of the use of formal investigatory and prosecutorial
mechanisms. What is no less clear, but far less quantifiable, is that
resignations and retirements of unfitjudges have been accomplished
through less formal-and less public-persuasion. Neither public
pressure nor behind-the-scenes urging have been uniformly
effective, but it is clear that the existence of the big stick of
impeachment in conjunction with the mechanisms more recently
provided by the Judicial Councils Reform andJudicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980,245 allows the occasional effective use of
soft speech in "suggesting" modification of judicial behavior 246 or
resignation or retirement from office.
2 47
244 SOLOMON, supra note 117, at 88.
245 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
24 6 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing examples of informal
modification ofjudicial behavior by chief judges).
247 The 1980 Act, of course, has only provided leverage for inducing modification
of judicial behavior for the past 13 years.
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C. Prosecutions Outside the Impeachment Process
One concern that has been expressed about various proposals
to reform or streamline judicial discipline has been that judges
should be fully accountable for their actions and subject to the full
range of prosecution, both local and federal, for all transgressions
of the law. Although the constitutionality of prosecuting judges
prior to impeachment and conviction is an unresolved and pressing
issue, there are strong arguments that the framers of the Constitu-
tion never intended that impeachment must invariably precede
other legal actions against federaljudges. 248 The bribery section of
the Crimes Act of 1790249 is the most often cited example of eigh-
teenth-century understanding of the issue.250 Perhaps a more
immediately compelling example is the case of Supreme Court
Justice James Wilson.
Justice Wilson's tribulations, widely known to his contemporar-
ies, support the contention that the founding generation did not
contemplate federal judges being above the law, nor imprisonment
(albeit of a "private" nature, without immediate resort to impeach-
ment to remove a judge from the bench). Appointed by George
Washington to the first Supreme Court in 1789, James Wilson had
already had an outstanding career in the law and in nation-build-
ing.251  In addition to his more admirable activities, however,
Wilson engaged in various speculative financial schemes, which
began to catch up with him in the closing years of the eighteenth
century. 252 In 1798, Harrison Gray Otis wrote to his wife that
248 See, e.g., Shane, supra note 11, at 225-32; Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career
Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal Judges, 76 Ky. L.J. 643, 665-73 (1988)
(elaborating the arguments in favor of allowing preimpeachment criminal prosecu-
tion).
249 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117. Section 21 states, inter alia, that
"thejudge... who shall in any way accept or receive [a bribe], on conviction thereof,
shall be fined and imprisoned at the discretion of the court," and "shall forever be
disqualified to hold any office of honour, trust, or profit under the United States."
Id.
251 See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Bazan, Disqualification of Federal Judges Convicted of
Bribey-An Examination of the Act of April 30, 1790 and Related Issues, in 2 RESEARCH
PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 1285,
1297-1301 (1993); MichaelJ. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and
Its Alternative, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1, 29-32 (1989) (discussing some commentators' views
on the implications of the Act of 1790). Professor Shane argues that the Crimes Act
argument is "inconclusive." See Shane, supra note 11, at 228.
251 See 1 WARREN, supra note 51, at 45.
2 52 See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800, supra note 49,
at 48.
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Justice Wilson "left this city [Philadelphia] a few days since to escape
from his creditors but managed with so little address that he has got
himself arrested at New Castle in Delaware where he will probably
be imprisoned." 253  Wilson was indeed imprisoned; after his
release, he rode the Southern Circuit in an attempt to flee further
from his creditors.
254
There may have been some initial question about whether
process could be served on the Justice while actually sitting: South
Carolina Congressman John Rutledge, Jr. (son of Associate Justice
Rutledge), wrote to his uncle Edward Rutledge that "heretofore it
has been supposed by [Wilson's] Creditors that he was not tangible
during the sitting of the Court, but this doctrine is over-ruled, & he
has not been able to make his appearance at the Court held this
month."255  Wilson's judicial activities were further disrupted
when another creditor caught up with him on the Southern Circuit
and had him imprisoned in Edenton, North Carolina, for two
months in the spring of 1798.256 This state of affairs probably
would not have been allowed to continue, however, had Wilson's
death in August of 1798 not intervened. SamuelJohnston wrote to
his brother-in-law, Justice James Iredell, intimating that a prosecu-
tion was in store if Wilson could not bring himself to resign,
opining that, "surely, if his feelings are not rendered altogether
callous, by his misfortunes, he will not suffer himself to be disgraced
by a conviction on an impeachment."257 With the exception of
the brief reticence of Wilson's creditors to serve process while he
was sitting-which appears to have been more out of deference to
the Court than a sense of Wilson's individual judicial im-
munity-there is no evidence of objection to his imprisonment as an
unconstitutional removal. Of course, private prosecutions do not
253 Letter from Harrison Gray Otis to Sally Otis (Feb. 18, 1798), in 1 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800, supra note 49, at 858.
254 See id. at 859 n.1.
25 Letter from RepresentativeJohn Rutledge,Jr., to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 25,
1798), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800, supra note
49, at 858.
256 There may be some question about whether Wilson was physically restrained
in Edenton or was kept there under threat of imprisonment. See Letter from Pierce
Butler to Samuel Wallis (June 14, 1798), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800,supra note 49, at 277-78 n.3; Letter from Hannah Wilson
to Bird Wilson (Sept. 1, 1798), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT,
1789-1800, supra note 49, at 289 n.1.
2 Letter from SamuelJohnston to James Iredell (July 28, 1798), in 1 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800, supra note 49, at 859.
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implicate the same concerns about independence as prosecutions
emanating from the executive department. Judges enjoy no
immunity from liability in civil actions unconnected with their
judicial function.
258
1. Department of Justice Prosecutions
Although not dispositive of the constitutionality of preimpeach-
ment prosecutions, historical precedent indicates an acceptance of
them. This presumption has not always been accepted: statements
by attorneys general and their staffs indicate that the Department
of Justice did not settle into an assumption of the propriety of
unilateral prosecutions until sometime after the 1920s, and perhaps
not until the 1970s. As the earlier discussion ofJustice Department
attitudes toward the investigation of federal judges suggests, the
Department vacillated somewhat in the early decades of this century
on the propriety of conducting investigations without a congressio-
nal request that it do so. 2 59 It is likewise difficult to determine
exactly when the Department concluded that unilateral prosecutions
were permissible.
In 1905, the Justice Department concluded in the case of Judge
Francis Baker that preimpeachment prosecution was impermissi-
ble. 260  By 1973, this understanding no longer held true.2 61
When the change in policy occurred is unclear. Although the
Department of'Justice sought indictments against numerous judges
in the intervening years, in each case the judge resigned prior to
prosecution.
262
In 1905, under Attorney General William H. Moody (whojoined
the Supreme Court the following year), the Justice Department took
the position that no sitting judge could be indicted without first
being removed from office by impeachment. In that year, com-
plaints surfaced that Seventh Circuit Judge Francis Baker had
coerced postal employees to contribute to the Indiana State
25 8 See MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY: SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHcs, AND DISCIPLINE 235-36 (1987) (noting thatjudicial immunity
from civil liability obtains only when the challenged action is "judicial" in nature).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 200-03.
260 See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
261 In 1973, theJustice Department initiated a prosecution ofJudge Otto Kerner,
Jr. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
262 For examplejudgesJohn Warren Davis, Martin Manton, and AlbertJohnson,
were all indicted by the Justice Department, but each resigned before being
prosecuted. See VAN TASSEL, supra note 14, app.
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Republican Party in 1902.263 A postal employee in Goshen,
Indiana, filed charges with the U.S. Civil Service Commission, which
investigated the matter and issued findings in October 1905.
Their report detailed a story, corroborated by several witnesses, in
which employees were told by the assistant postmaster to pay a
visit to Judge Francis Baker. The judge explained to the employ-
ees that it was in the workers' best interests to ensure that
Republicans were kept in office, as Democrats would probably fire
them. The judge then told the employees that he gave liberally to
the party (about 5 percent of his salary) and that they should do
the same. One worker said he could not afford that amount, and
the judge is reported as replying, "You can afford to do without a
suit of clothes and make the payment."
264
The commission recommended turning the matter over to the
Department ofJustice, where it was determined that both legal and
political barriers stood in the way of indicting Judge Baker. The
first contention was that preimpeachment prosecution was imper-
missible, and the second was that even if indictment without
impeachment was possible, the statute of limitations appeared to
have run. Impeachment was considered improbable since Congress
was unlikely to either impeach or convict on the charges alone. As
a result, Baker continued in office. In the end, the matter was so
thoroughly forgotten that Baker was among three finalists for a
Supreme Court seat in 1922.265
When another Seventh Circuit Judge, Otto Kerner, Jr., was
indicted for offenses committed while he was governor of Illinois,
his counsel argued that indictment was tantamount to removal and
thus unconstitutional because it was outside the sole constitutionally
prescribed means of removing a federal judge.266 The Seventh
Circuit did not agree, noting that "[p]rotection of tenure is not a
license to commit crime or a forgiveness of crimes committed
before taking office."267 The court not only found no support for
Kerner's position, but opined that judicial independence "is better
263 See SOLOMON, supra note 117, at 61.
264 Id. at 61-62 (citation omitted).
265 See id. at 63. Solomon notes that "[ain investigation of theJustice Department
appointment files ofJudge Baker in the National Archives revealed no mention of the
1905 scandal during the selection process." Id. at 63 n.76.
266 Brief for Appellant Otto KernerJr., at 43-52, United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d
1124 (7th Cir. 1973) (No. 73-1410). The charges against Kerner included bribery,
mail fraud, and tax evasion.267 Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1142.
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served when criminal charges against its members are tried in a
court rather than in Congress. With a court trial, ajudge is assured
of the protections given to all those charged with criminal con-
duct." 26 8 Judge Kerner resigned after his appeals were de-
nied, 269 so the ancillary question of what to do about criminally
convicted and imprisoned judges who do not resign was left to the
judicial prosecutions of the 1980s and early 1990s.
2. Local Prosecutions
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, another Supreme
Court justice briefly found himself on the wrong end of the law,
although unlike the source ofJames Wilson's travails, 270 this time it
was the criminal law. While riding circuit in California, Justice
Stephen Field heard a messy case involving marriage, divorce, fraud,
and forgery.2 71 The plaintiff and her attorney, David S. Terry (a
former justice on the Supreme Court of California), were volatile,
vindictive sorts who threatened violence against Field on several
occasions. The special deputy hired to protect Field against these
threats eventually shot and killed Terry when Terry attacked Field.
Field was arrested for murder, although he avoided jail by immedi-
ately filing a petition for habeas corpus. After a preliminary
hearing, Field was released on his own recognizance with a $5000
bond. Before any jurisdictional or constitutional matters could be
raised, California's governor intervened and successfully urged that
the proceedings be dismissed. Another of thejudges involved noted
that
[w]e are extremely gratified to find that, through the [action of
the] chief magistrate, and the Attorney-General, a higher officer
of the law, we shall be spared the necessity of further inquiry as to
the extent of the remedy afforded the distinguished petitioner, by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of enforcing
such remedies as exist, and that the stigma cast upon the state of
California by this hasty and, to call it by no harsher term, ill-
advised arrest, will not be intensified by further prosecution.
272
268 Id. at 1144.
269 See Kerner Quits U.S. AppealsJudgeship, WASH. POsT,July 25, 1974, atA2;Kerner
Resigns Seat, N.Y. TimEs, July 25, 1974, at 34; Seth S. King, Ex-Gov. Otto Kerner Dies;
Convicted While a Judge, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1976, at 30.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 251-57.
271 See Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885); SWISHER, supra note 170, at
321-61.
272 SWISHER, supra note 170, at 355 (citation omitted).
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The question of whether a federal judge can be tried, convicted, and
imprisoned without first being impeached, convicted, and removed
by Congress remains unanswered.
In 1907, Illinois prosecutors succeeded in what was probably the
first indictment of a sitting federal judge.273 Judge Peter Grosscup
of the Seventh Circuit was also president and principal owner of the
Mattoon City Railway, which had been involved in a serious accident
in which fifteen people were killed and many others injured. This
event, in conjunction with two previous accidents involving serious
injuries, caused community outrage of sufficient magnitude to
encourage a prosecutor to seek indictments of the owners on
charges of criminal negligence. Grosscup, along with five other
directors, was brought to trial in February of 1908. After three days
of argument, the judge quashed the indictments on the grounds that
there could be no criminal liability unless the directors were actually
present and in control of the train. The circumstances do not seem
to implicate judicial independence: the holding of the court was
based on lack of personal liability of directors. Indeed, unlike the
prosecution of Judge Otto Kerner, Jr.-also for nonjudicial ac-
tions274-the prosecution of Judge Grosscup was not initiated by a
federal prosecutor of the opposite party. No one addressed the
question whether Grosscup, as a sitting federal judge, had to be
impeached before being indicted.
275
3. Summary
Consultants to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline
and Removal, as well as the Commission itself in its Report,
acknowledge the value ofJustice Department prosecutions indepen-
dent of the impeachment process. 276 The Commission recom-
mends their continuation with additional safeguards to ensure full
disclosure to Congress and oversight within the Department.
277
273 See SOLOMON, supra note 117, at 58. This statement is reserved to Article HI
judges. As is noted above, territorial judges may have received different treatment.
See supra note 149.
274 See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
275 See SOLOMON, supra note 117, at 57-58.
276 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 72-79.
277 These safeguards would include sharing information with Congress if an
impeachable offense is involved, and requiring that any "full scale investigation" of
a federal judge or "intrusive investigative techniques" used in such an investigation
be cleared by the Attorney General herself. Id. at 79, 81.
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The practical reality these recommendations reflect is the fact that
congressional policing of the more than 800 sitting federal judges
and a cadre of senior judges is effectively impossible. This reality,
however, is tempered by the disciplinary mechanisms provided for
under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980.278 With the Act in place and applied
properly, the burden on Congress should arise only as a last resort
or when members of Congress are sufficiently concerned about a
particular judge to set the impeachment machinery in motion.
As Professor Shane has argued, the framers did not discuss or
address "judiciary-dependent" means for judicial removal.279
Thus, making constitutional arguments one way or the other is less
fruitful-because such arguments are ultimately indeterminate-than
addressing the issue anew and assessing the historical record with
regard to how "judiciary-dependent" discipline and removal has
functioned in the context of judicial independence concerns.
History cautions against assuming that the protections of the
criminal justice system, which are, at least formally, available to all
American citizens, are adequate to protect societal interests in
judicial independence. While it seems reasonable to assume that,
in the criminal context, ajudge who has done nothing wrong should
have nothing to fear from the criminal justice system, and a judge
who has done something wrong should be exposed and brought to
justice, independence issues complicate the equation. Thejudiciary
has come under significant and sustained attack from the Executive
and from Congress at various times in our history.280 Congressio-
nal attacks are carried out in a relatively public fashion with the
admittedly imperfect protections that the political process provides.
But while impeachment is serious, it is clearly political, and, perhaps
as a consequence, does not carry the same stigma-and certainly not
the same penalties-as criminal conviction.
281
Executive attacks, on the other hand, have sometimes been
carried out in ways that may not only undermine the appearance of
278 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
279 See Shane, supra note 11, at 212.
280 See supra notes 169-243 and accompanying text.
281 Witness the election of former Judge Alcee Hastings to the very body that
effected his removal from the bench through the impeachment process. The
conclusion of one student of the impeachment of federal judges is that only the least
culpable judges refuse to resign, choosing to take their chances with impeachment.
See BoRKIN, supra note 14, at 195.
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integrity of the Justice Department,282 but also may undermine
public faith in the independence of the judiciary. The actions of
Attorney General John Mitchell regarding Justice Abe Fortas283 or
Attorney General William Mitchell regarding Judge Harry Ander-
son 284 suggest that vesting the responsibility for approving investiga-
tions and prosecutions in the Attorney General may not be
adequate to allay the appearance of executive branch manipulation
of judicial independence.
H. RETmEMENT AND DIsABILrn'
Some commentators argue that many problems with federal
judges can be attributed to the aging process and its attendant
infirmities.28 5 Congress has occasionally acted over the years to
deal with these problems by giving aging judges incentives to retire.
The following discussion provides a statutory and historical context
for the choices that judges have made about retirement and the
attempts to deal with judicial infirmity.
286
A. Retirement
For the first eight decades of the federal judiciary, Congress
made no provision for the retirement of Article HI judges. Aged
judges were forced to choose between resigning from the bench and
losing their salary, or continuing in office (often despite incapacity)
in order to retain financial support. During that eighty-year period,
only twenty judges left office for reasons of age or health. By way
of comparison, Congress investigated sixteen Article HI judges
during that same period; five of those judges resigned or were
removed. 28 7 Within the first thirty years after Congress provided
for retirement, the number of retirements equaled the number of
age and health resignations for the previous eighty years.
112 Seesupra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing the appearance problems
created by the investigation ofJudge John Singleton).283 See supra text accompanying notes 226-34.
2'4 See supra text accompanying notes 206-14.
285 John S. Goff, Old Age and the Supreme Court, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL
DIScIPLiNE AND REMOVAL 30, 30 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1973).
286 Current retirement and disability provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 371-
372 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
287 For the 16 investigations, see infra app., tbl. 1. The five judges who resigned
or were removed as a result of investigations were John Pickering (D.N.H. 1804),
William Stevens (D. Ga. 1818), Matthias Tallmadge (D.N.Y. 1819), Thomas Irwin
(W.D. Pa. 1859), and West H. Humphreys (D. Tenn. 1862).
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Lacking any provision for retirement, many judges remained on
the bench after becoming incapable of serving adequately. For
instance, Justice Henry Baldwin, appointed to the Supreme Court
by Andrew Jackson in 1830, died in office in 1844 at the age of
sixty-four.2 8 8 One account states that "[tiowards the close of his
life his intellect became deranged, and he was violent and ungovern-
able in his conduct upon the bench."289 Of Associate Justice John
McKinley, Attorney GeneralJohnJ. Crittenden commented that "for
many of the last years of his life he was enfeebled and afflicted by
disease, and his active usefulness interrupted and impaired."
29 0
Between 1809 and 1869, members of Congress proposed four
constitutional amendments that would have established mandatory
retirement ages for federal judges.2 9 1 Senator Pope of Kentucky
proposed the first of these in 1809 in connection with a proposal
for the removal ofjudges which would have forced judges to retire
at sixty-five. 292 Similar proposals reached the floor in 1826 and
1836.93 In 1869, Representative Ashley bemoaned the state of
the Supreme Court with "one-third of its members sleeping upon
the bench and dying with age, and one-third or more crazed with
the glitter of the Presidency." 29 4 He proposed dealing with part
of the problem by constitutionally limiting judicial terms to twenty
years and mandating retirement at age seventy.
295
Although it failed to approve Ashley's amendment in 1869,
Congress that year for the first time passed retirement legislation
allowing a judge who had reached the age of seventy and who had
served at least ten years to retire on an annual pension equal to his
salary at the time he retired. 96 This law was the first glimmer of
2 88 See BICENTENNIAL COMM. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., JUDGES
OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (2d ed. 1983).
289 See Goff, supra note 285, at 31 (quoting 1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, HISTORY OF
Tm SUPREME COURT OF Tim UNITED STATES 281 (1902)).
290 Id. at 32.
291 See AMES, supra note 160, at 151 (describing the content of proposals designed
to limit tenure ofjudges). Another 18 legislative amendments proposed between
1807 and 1879 would have limited judicial terms in office, with the limits ranging
from 4 to 20 years. See id. at 151-52.
292 See id. at 151.
293 See id.; see also SJ. Res. 22, 26, 28-29, 11th Cong., 2d Sess. (1908).
294 AMES, supra note 160, at 151.
295 See id.
296 See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45 ("[A]nyjudge of any court
of the United States, who, ... having attained to the age of seventy years, [shall]
resign his office, shall thereafter, during the residue of his natural life, receive the
same salary which was by law payable to him at the time of his resignation.").
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official recognition that the constitutional language definingjudicial
tenure as "during good behavior" need not always mean "for life,"
and that there were good reasons to allow elderly judges to retire
without consigning them to destitution.
297
The first instance of a requested retirement under the new act
was probably that of Justice Robert C. Grier.298 Elderly and ailing,
the judge submitted his resignation in December of 1869 after a
committee of justices visited him to request that he step down.
299
Many years later, the aged Justice Stephen Field was reminded of his
participation in seeking Grier's resignation when confronted with
a similar deputation, prompting him to exclaim, "a dirtier day's
work I never did in my lifel" 0 0
Lower courtjudges as well as Supreme Courtjustices immediate-
ly availed themselves of the new retirement provisions. Between
1869 and 1919, approximately one judge per year retired under the
new provision. Then, in 1919, Congress made it possible forjudges
to retire from active duty without resigning from office. 0 1 This
provision allowed judges over the age of seventy to continue to
297 The discussion of retirement and disability legislation has benefitted greatly
from the following sources: Judicial Independence: Discipline and Conduct: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration oflustice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1989) (testimony of U.S.
CircuitJudge Frank M. Coffin) [hereinafter Hearings]; Robert Keeton, The Office of
SeniorJudge, in 2 FEDERAL COURT STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMr-
TEE REPORTS 154 (1990); Memorandum from Eric Laumann to Professor Stephen
Burbank (Aug. 4, 1989) (describing research done while Laumann was a student at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School) (on file with author).
298 See Goff, supra note 285, at 32 (noting that the resignation of the mentally and
physically disabled judge was forced).
299 See id.
s0 Id. at 35.
101 See Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, 40 Stat. 1156, 1157. Section 6 states:
But, instead of resigning, anyjudge other than ajustice of the Supreme
Court, who is qualified to resign under the foregoing provisions, may retire,
upon the salary of which he is then in receipt, from regular active service
on the bench, and the President shall thereupon be authorized to appoint
a successor; but ajudge so retiring may nevertheless be called upon by the
senior circuit judge of that circuit and be by him authorized to perform
such judicial duties in such circuit as such retired judge may be willing to
undertake, or he may be called upon by the ChiefJustice and be by him
authorized to perform such judicial duties in any other circuit as such
retired judge may be willing to undertake, or he may be called upon either
by the presiding judge or senior judge of any other such court and be by
him authorized to perform suchjudicial duties in such court as such retired
judge may be willing to undertake.
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serve according to their desire and ability, while allowing the
President to appoint an additional judge to carry a full caseload.
Since 1919, Congress has fine-tuned judicial retirement provisions
on several occasions.
Changes in the rules governing judicial retirements that have
occurred piecemeal over the course of the twentieth century in
conjunction with a dearth of historical and statistical information
about senior judges, complicates policy analysis in this area. As an
initial matter, knowing what the rules governing judicial retirement
have been at different points in time provides a framework for
assessing any changes over time in such things as the rates of senior
status retirements versus "complete" retirements and whether
incentives to retire have historically served the interests of both the
judges and the institution. In 1937, Supreme Court justices were
given the same choice between retiring or resigning that other life-
term judges had been given in 1919.'0 In 1948, Congress modi-
fied the salary provisions so that judges resigning at age seventy,
after ten years of service, would receive the salary they were
receiving when they resigned, but judges choosing to retire from
regular active service would receive the salary of the office-that is,
they would be eligible for all pay raises." 3 In 1954, Congress ex-
tended the "senior status" option (retirement from regular active
service on the salary of the office) to judges who had reached the
age of sixty-five and served at least fifteen years. Judges who wished
to resign on salary still had to be seventy and have served for at
least ten years.30 4 In 1958, Congress changed the name of judges
retiring from regular active service from "retired"judges to "senior"
judges." 5 In addition, judicial retirement provisions have been
modified several times since 1980, the original cut-off date for this
study. Since 1980, for instance, the modified "rule of 80" was
adopted, allowing judges to take senior status on a sliding scale of
age and service, starting at age sixty-five with fifteen years of service,
and moving up to age seventy with ten years of service, always
providing that the sum of age and years of service equal eighty. 6
's See Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24, 24.
' See Act ofJune 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-713, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 869.
s See Act of Feb. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-294, ch. 6, 68 Stat. 8, 12.
o See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 5, 85 Stat. 848, 849.
s See Act ofJuly 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. I, § 204(a), 98 Stat. 333, 350
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1988)).
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Additionally, the late 1980s saw the introduction of a service
certification process for judges to remain in senior status.
30 7
Between 1919 and 1979, approximately 450 judges retired or
took senior status.3 08 From 1980 to 1989, at least 197 judges
retired from regular active service (took "senior status") and an
additional fourteen "retired from the office." Of the 211 judges
who chose to reduce their workload once they became eligible to do
so, 7% resigned completely. From 1990 to the end of 1992, ninety-
nine judges took senior status and fourteen more chose to resign
completely, representing an apparent doubling of the rate of
"retirements from the office" to 14%.309 Of the fourteen judges
who retired from the office from 1990 to 1992, we have information
on the subsequent activities of all but one. Seven judges have
returned to private practice, three have taken full-time teaching
positions, one retired completely, and two have engaged in business
activities. The average age at termination of those retiring from the
office in the 1990s is seventy-five; the average age at termination of
the seven who are known to have gone into private practice is sixty-
nine. These seven judges served on the federal bench for an
average of eighteen years each.
Because the 1990 numbers represent only three years of the
decade, and because we do not yet have historical data for compari-
son, these numbers should be interpreted with caution. But there
is a perception within the judiciary that there is a rising number of
judges who may be treating the judiciary, in the words of Chief
'07 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 30, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, tit. VII, § 705(a), 103 Stat.
1716, 1770 (amending 28 U.S.C. 371(a) (1988)).
308 Currently, no accurate figures exist on the total number ofjudges who have
taken senior status since its inception in 1919 or on the number who retired from
office under what is now § 371(a). The information supplied by the Administrative
Office personnel office only goes back to 1966 and appears to be incomplete, and the
information in the FJHOJudge Biographical Database on senior status judges is being
updated and verified. In a report to Congress in 1976, the AOUSC listed only one
judge as receiving a pension under § 371(a). See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciaty, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. app. A (1976) (statement of Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr.).
According to a list created by the General Counsel's Office of the AOUSC, updated
as of the end of 1992, an additional judge retired from the office effective 15 days be-
fore the above hearings.
309 These numbers were taken from a list ofjudicial resignations and retirements
provided by the General Counsel's Office of the AOUSC, in conjunction with a list
of senior status judges provided by the Human Resources Division of the AOUSC and
a list generated from the FJHO Judge Biographical Database. Because of the way
statistics and information have been collected and organized in the past, these
numbers should be treated as illustrative rather than definitive.
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Justice Rehnquist, as "a stepping stone to a lucrative private
practice." 1 0 Judge Abner Mikva (now Chief Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) noted that
"[t]his is supposed to be the last stop on the road. A judge
shouldn't be thinking about going back to work for a law firm that's
coming before him. That's unhealthy." 1 1  What these numbers
suggest, then, is that further study should be done of both senior




Retirement provisions did not solve all the problems of
incapacity on the bench. Section 25 of the short-lived Judiciary Act
of 1801 had provided for disability of district judges by directing
that the newly created circuit courts would have the power to
appoint a circuit judge from the court to take over the duties of a
disabled district judge within the circuit for as long as the disability
might continue.1 3 District Judge John Pickering of New Hamp-
shire was relieved under Section 25 of the 1801 Act; repeal of the
Act put him back on the bench and resulted in the first impeach-
ment and conviction of a federal judge. Pickering's "high crimes
and misdemeanors" were alcoholism and insanity.
3 1 4
In 1809 Congress addressed the issue of district judge disability
again. Although a proposed amendment to the Constitution that
would have forbidden judges to serve after reaching age sixty-five
failed to pass, Congress did pass a disability statute requiring the
Supreme Court justice assigned to the circuit in which there was a
disabled district judge to issue certiorari to the clerk of the district
310 McAllister, supra note 61, at A19.
311 Id.
312 A few studies already exist. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 297, at 24-26
(reviewing the legislative history of the seniorjudge system); Keeton, supra note 297,
at 154 (reviewing the legislative history of the seniorjudge system); Wilfred Feinberg,
SeniorJudges: A National Resource, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 409, 418 (1990) (encouraging
federal judges to work for as long as they are able to perform theirjobs). In 1938,
Charles Fairman did a study on judicial retirements which was confined to the
Supreme Court. See Charles Fairman, The Retirement of Federal Judges, 51 HARv. L.
REv. 397 (1938).
313 See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 25, 2 Stat. 89, 97 (repealed 1802).
814 One also might include "Federalism" among his crimes. See ELLIS, supra note
153, at 70-75 (discussing Pickering's impeachment in the context of the political
struggle between the Federalists and the Republicans).
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court to certify all pending matters to the next circuit court.3 15
What this procedure did, of course, was simply to shift the burden
of holding the district court to the justice sitting as a circuit judge
"during the continuance of such disability."316 No provision was
made for the retirement of a permanently disabled judge, or for the
appointment of a replacement.
Not until 1850 did Congress provide for the assignment, by a
circuitjudge or by the ChiefJustice, of a district judge from another
district to carry out the duties of a disabled district judge.31 7 The
illness of Samuel Rossiter Betts of the Southern District of New
York had apparently prompted the introduction of special legisla-
tion, which was then converted into general legislation.3 18 In
1863, Congress extended the coverage of the disability statute to
include temporary assignment of judges to hold circuit courts as
wel.
3 1 9
Although provisions existed for maintaining judicial efficiency
by temporarily assigning able judges to stand in for disabled judges,
it was still not possible for a disabled judge who did not meet the
age and service requirements to retire from active service and
receive his salary. As a result, Congress found itself passing special
legislation on several occasions after 1869 until it enacted general
legislation in 1919.
In 1875 Congress passed special legislation extending the
benefits of the 1869 retirement act to the districtjudge of Vermont,
David Allen Smalley, who had suffered a stroke.32 °  Wilson
McCandless of the Western District of Pennsylvania, who had served
for twenty years, was not yet seventy when he became physically
incapacitated for service. Congress responded to his incapacity by
passing legislation in 1876 allowing him to retire under the
provisions of the 1869 Act, provided that he resign within six
months of the passage of the special act.321 Similarly, in 1882,
Congress made the same provision for Supreme CourtJustice Ward
315 See Act of Mar. 2, 1809, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 534, 535.
316 Id.
517 See Act ofJuly 29, 1850, ch. 22, 9 Stat. 442, 442.
318 See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1850) (remarks of Mr.
Thompson); Resolutions and Other Proceedings upon the Retirement of FederalJudges, 30
F. Cas. 1285 (1897) (providing biographical data on Judge Samuel Rossiter Betts who
served in the Southern District of New York from 1826 to 1867).
319 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 93, § 1, 12 Stat. 768, 768.
320 See Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 83, 18 Stat. 329, 329.
321 See Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 119, 19 Stat. 57, 57.
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Hunt. Hunt had been on the Court for only six years when, on
January 5, 1879, he was "struck speechless with paralysis." 22 It
took three years of an understaffed Court before Congress acted in
January of 1882 to allow Hunt to retire under the provisions of the
1869 Act, notwithstanding the fact that he fell short of the ten-year
service requirement
23
In 1870, Congress responded to the petition of twenty-eight
members of the Galveston bar and provided a pension for Texas
District Court Judge Watrous, a judge who had served for twenty-
four years, survived four impeachment attempts, and was one year
short of retirement age.324 In 1910, and again in 1922, Congress
took the time to pass special retirement legislation for the benefit
of Associate Justices William Moody and Mahlon Pitney.3 25 Still,
it was not until 1939 that Congress made any general provision for
voluntary disability retirement.3 2 6 In that year Congress passed
an act allowing permanently disabled judges, regardless of age, who
had served for less than ten years to retire on half pay; those who
had served for ten years or more were permitted to retire on the
salary they were receiving at the time of their retirement.
3 2 7
In 1919, Congress dealt with the problem of the superannuated
judge who refused to resign or retire in spite of disability. In the
retirement act of that year, Congress authorized the President, "if
he finds that any [active judge at least seventy years old with ten or
more years of service] is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties
of his office by reason of mental or physical disability of permanent
character," to appoint an additional judge.328 The disabled judge
would then be considered junior to all other judges in the district
122 See Goff, supra note 285, at 33 (footnote omitted).
323 See Act ofJan. 27, 1882, ch. 4, 22 Stat. 2, 2.
'24 See Act of Apr. 5, 1870, ch. 44, 16 Stat. 81, 81; HAWKINS, supra note 184, at
62-64 (1950). Watrous was the subject of four impeachment investigations
throughout the 1850s and is commonly thought to have resigned as a result. See
BORKIN, supra note 14, at 253-54. However, he weathered all four, and his
resignation in 1870 followed a paralytic stroke suffered in early 1869. See HAWKINS,
supra note 184, at 62.
325 See Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 377, 36 Stat. 1861, 1861 (providing for early
retirement of William Moody); see also Act of Dec. 11, 1922, ch. 1, 42 Stat. 1063, 1063
(providing for early retirement of Mahlon Pitney).
326 See Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 433, § 1, 53 Stat. 1204, 1204. The disability
provisions in the 1919 Act only applied to judges eligible to retire upon meeting the
age and service requirements of 70 plus 10.
327 See id.
328 Act of Feb. 25, 1919, Pub. L. No. 265, 40 Stat. 1156, 1158.
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or circuit.8 29  In 1957 Congress authorized the circuit judicial
councils to certify a judge as disabled by a majority vote of the
members of the judge's judicial council. Such certification was then
to be passed on to the President for the purposes of appointing
another judge if the President agreed it was necessary.
8 0
The statutes that have provided forjudicial disability retirements
over the years have allowed a certain amount of flexibility in dealing
with judges unable to dispatch business in a reasonably efficient
manner. But they have also caused a certain amount of confusion.
The probable first use of the 1919 "involuntary" disability statute,
occurring in 1928, illustrates the opacity of congressional intent in
this area.
The lone district judge for the state of Kansas, seventy-year-old
JudgeJohn Pollock, under pressure of an overwhelming backlog and
consequent unfavorable newspaper stories demanding his resigna-
tion, consulted the Retirement Act of 1919 and decided that if he
refused to retire but asked the President to appoint an extra judge
in light of the infirmities of his age, he could get some help with his
docket without giving up his position. He wrote to his senators and
to President Coolidge expressing his wishes: "Not intending to
either retire or resign, I hereby respectfully request that you appoint
an additional District Judge for the District of Kansas to assist me
in accordance with [the involuntary disability provision]."33l
President Coolidge replied on December 12 that "your retirement
effective at once is approved."8 2 An "astonished" Judge Pollock
immediately wired the President, exclaiming, "I have not retired,"
and reiterating that "[a]l I have requested or consented to is
appointment of [an] additional judge for this district."333
Judge Pollock's action prompted an extraordinary flurry of
correspondence as well as an eight-page memorandum of law
apparently from the Attorney General's office outlining the possible
ramifications of Judge Pollock's unprecedented request.33 4 The
329 See id.
..0 See Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-261, 71 Stat. 586 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 372).
331 Letter from Judge John Pollock to President Calvin Coolidge (Dec. 5, 1927)
(on file with AOUSC, Human Resources Division).
332 Letter from President Calvin Coolidge toJudgeJohn Pollock (Dec. 12, 1927)
(on file with AOUSC, Human Resources Division).
333 Telegram from Judge John Pollock to President Calvin Coolidge (Dec. 15,
1927) (on file with AOUSC, Human Resources Division).
3M See Unsigned Memorandum from file on Judge John Pollock (on file with
AOUSC, Human Resources Division).
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Attorney General ultimately concluded that it would be better for
the government in most cases to appoint extra judges under the
involuntary disability provision because, unlike the "retirement from
regular active service" section, disabled judges could be required
rather than merely requested to work. The President ultimately
appointed another judge.
33 5
From Judge Pollock's perspective, the result of invoking the
disability provision rather than retiring was mixed. He became
junior to the new judge just as he would have had he retired. But
he believed that under the disability section he would be protected
from the effective removal that would occur if no designation to sit
were forthcoming for him. As noted some time later by the circuit
executive for the Seventh Circuit, "[s]enior district and circuit
judges sit by designation. Their judicial career can be ended
by... revoking or not issuing a designation." 36 It is not clear,
however, that Judge Pollock was correct in his assessment of the
effect of involuntary disability.
Since 1928, judges, the President, or circuit councils have
invoked the involuntary disability provision at least ten other
times. 337 In at least four, and probably six, of those cases, the
involuntary disability provision was used so that the judges involved,
who did not meet the service requirements for full-pay retirement,
would be entitled to continue receiving their salaries. In at least
one additional case, Judge A. Lee Wyman of South Dakota, who
qualified for senior status and could continue to receive the salary
of the office, refused to do so, but late in 1953 he requested that
the President appoint an additional judge because of his disability.
The Committee on Retirement ofJudges of the Judicial Conference
of the United States may have had Judge Wyman in mind when it
noted that the committee had learned that in some instances,
"judges contemplating retirement had hesitated to accept it because
the term to them carried a connotation of inability to carry on
judicial duties." 338 It therefore proposed that section 371(b) of
35 See Memorandum fromJusticeJohn Marshall to Everett Sanders (Jan. 20,1928)
(on file with AOUSC, Human Resources Division).
336 Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of FederalJudges: The Unreported
Informal Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282, 282 n.2 (1988).
17 According to AOUSC files, the 10judges who invoked the section are Pollock,
Michie, Boyd, Wyman, Rizely, Burke, Roberts, Unthank, Cholakis, and Buinno. This
number may underreport the number of occurrences, but it is clear that the section
has not been invoked frequently.
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Title 28 "be amended so as to designate ajudge taking advantage of
the retirement provisions as 'senior judge' instead of his being
called a 'retired judge' as at present."33 9 Judge Wyman asked
President Eisenhower to appoint an additional judge toward the end
of 1953; it may be that the Committee on Retirement had learned
of his case. Congress did not follow through on the Judicial
Conference recommendation until 1958, five years after the
"involuntary" disability of Judge Wyman.
3 40
CONCLUSION
An observer of the Supreme Court once noted that "the old men
of the court seldom died and never retired."3 41 We know, howev-
er, that lower court judges as well as Supreme Court justices have
retired, and that they have resigned as well. Judges have left office
over the years, some in disgrace, many to pursue private-sector
employment, some to seek other avenues of public service. What
is perhaps most remarkable, however, is that the number of resigna-
tions have been so few. This low turnover may be interpreted in a
number of ways, not all of them positive. Before retirement
legislation was passed beginning in the 1860s, it is clear that many
judges were staying on the bench beyond the point at which they
could function effectively. And clearly some unfit judges have
stayed on the bench because no one could figure out how to get
them off. Still, the low turnover rate of federal judges does suggest
a relatively high rate of job satisfaction, from the point of view of
both the judges and those who are empowered to remove them.
Although this study shows that the known cases of judicial
misconduct have often come to light in groups and do not tend to
occur at regular rates, it cannot definitively answer the question of
whether judicial misconduct is in fact on the rise. What it does
show, however, is that the means for dealing with such misconduct
has changed. Although a busy Congress quite reasonably presumed
that efficiency would be served by entrusting "judicial discipline"
involving criminal behavior to the Department of Justice, in every
recent case the outcome has undercut that supposition. Criminal
REPORT 8-9 (1954).
3" Id. at 8.
340 See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 5, 72 Stat. 848, 849 (1958)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 294(b)).
341 Goff, supra note 285, at 30 (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMEs
OF WnIlAM HOWARD TAFr 956 (1964)).
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convictions in the 1980s and early 1990s have not taken the
impeachment burden off Congress. In fact, had Congress investigat-
ed and threatened to impeach Judges Claiborne, Hastings, Nixon,
Aguilar, and Collins prior to their criminal convictions, it is quite
possible that at least some of them would have resigned.
Without offering any conclusions about the motivations of past
investigations and coercion of judges to resign, it is clear that these
means have often proven very effective (although not uniformly so)
in getting judges off the bench. On the other hand, the recent
Department ofJustice prosecutions ofjudges have not had the same
effect.3 42 One can certainly argue that the honorable thing for
the recently prosecuted judges to do would have been to resign
once they were indicted (as Martin Manton did in 1939), or at the
very least, when they were setting off to jail (as Otto Kerner did in
1974). But it is not hard to see that if resignation were not offered
by the Justice Department in cooperation with Congress as a form
of plea-bargaining, once convicted, there would be no particular
incentive for a judge to resign, and perhaps a strong incentive not
to resign.
343
For instance, after his criminal conviction, Harry Claiborne
clearly saw the impeachment process as a second chance to
vindicate himself.344 Additionally, if a convicted judge runs the
risk of disbarment, and thus cannot return to the lucrative practice
of law to earn a living, that judge would have a clear incentive to
hold on to the salary and benefits of judicial office as long as
possible. And finally, ajudge who has gone through a criminal trial,
been convicted, and sent to prison is not likely to view impeachment
with quite the same fear of public humiliation or as having quite the
same level of threat to reputation as would ajudge who has not had
(and wishes to be spared) those experiences.
The policy question is whether the goal of prosecution and
conviction is paramount, or whether removal of bad judges from the
342 Thomas E. Baker argues that "[t]he most telling point against reliance on the
criminal-prosecution mechanism to increase judicial responsibility may be its practical
inefficacy." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND: TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, THE GOODJUDGE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY 62 (1989).
" On lack of congressional involvement, see Grimes, supra note 2 (documenting
the decline in the number of congressional impeachment investigations during the
past fifty years).
34 "Judge Claiborne... has refused to resign because he said he wants to present
his defense in an impeachment trial in the Senate." Wallace Turner, Impeachment May
Focus on Intrigue, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1986, at A20.
1993] RESIGNATIONS AND REMOVALS 407
bench (with the risk that they might not ultimately be prosecuted)
is the overriding goal. If removal is the goal, then the evidence
suggests that the big stick of impeachment, prior to prosecution,
effectively goads judges to voluntarily resign. It seems likely that
impeachment is less of a threat when one has already been
prosecuted than it would be in the absence of prosecution.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Judges Listed in Chronological Order with Reason for Termination





















Appointment to Other Office
Returned to Private Practice







Returned to Private Practice
1800-1809
1800 Ellsworth, Oliver S. Ct. Age/Health
1804 Moore, Alfred S. Ct. Age/Health
1804 Pickering, John D.N.H. Impeachment & Conviction
1806 Kilty, William D.C. Cir. Appointment to Other Office
1810-1819
1813 Hall, Dominic A. D. La. Inadequate Salary
1818 Sewall, David D. Me. Age/Health
1818 Stephens, William D. Ga. Allegations of Misbehavior






















Year Name Court Reason for Resignation
1824 Bland, Theodric D. Md. Other Employment
1824 Dick, John M. D. La. Elected Office
1825 Tucker, St. George D. Va. Age/Health
1826 Tait, Charles D. Ala. Other Employment
1830-1839
1831 Wilkins, William W.D. Pa. Elected Office
1833 McNairy, John D. Tenn. Age/Health
1835 Duvall, Gabriel S. Ct. Age/Health
1836 Ellis, Powhatan D. Miss. Appointment to Other Office
1836 Glenn, Elias D. Md. Age/Health
1838 Adams, George D. Miss. Dissatisfaction with Office
1840-1849
1841 Davis, John A. D. Mass. Age/Health
1841 Dickerson, Mahlon D.NJ. Relinquished Court to Brother
1842 Paine, Elijah D. Vt. Age/Health
1844 Mason, John Y. E.D. Va. Appointment to Other Office
1845 Pennybacker, Isaac S. W.D. Va. Elected Office
1850-1859
1852 Conkling, Alfred N.D.N.Y. Appointment to Other Office
1857 Curtis, Benjamin R. S. Ct. Dissatisfaction with Office
1859 Irwin, Thomas W.D. Pa. Allegations of Misbehavior
1860-1869
Magrath, Andrew G. D.S.C.
Biggs, Asa D.N.C.
Boyce, Henry W.D. La.
Brockenbrough, John W. W.D. Va.
Campbell, John A. S. Ct.
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
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Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy
Loyalty to the Confederacy



















































































Appointment to Other Office





Appointment to Other Office
Age/Health
Retired
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Year Name Court Reason for Resignation
1887 MacArthur, Arthur D.D.C. Retired
1887 Treat, Samuel E.D. Mo. Retired
1888 Dyer, Charles E. E.D. Wis. Other Employment


































































Appointment to Other Office
Returned to Private Practice
Returned to Private Practice
Appointment to Other Office












































































1912 Hanford, Cornelius H.
1912 Locke, James W.
S. Ct. Age/Health
E.D. La. Inadequate Salary
D.S.C. Retired
7th Cir. Allegations of Misbehavior
D. Mont. Dissatisfaction with Office
E.D. Mich.Returned to Private Practice
W.D. Returned to Private Practice
Wash.
















A. E.D. Mo. Age/Health
N.D.N.Y. Retired
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Returned to Private Practice
Dissatisfaction with Office
Returned to Private Practice
Allegations of Misbehavior
Age/Health
S.D. Ohio Returned to Private Practice
3d Cir. Impeachment & Conviction
1st Cir. Elected Office
4th Cir. Elected Office
2d Cir. Inadequate Salary
Ct. Cl. Retired
N.D. Ohio Inadequate Salary
S.D.N.Y. Retired
D.D.C. Allegations of Misbehavior
Ct. Cl. Retired
D. Utah Allegations of Misbehavior
Ct. Cl. Retired
S. Ct. Sought Elected Office-Defeated
2d Cir. Retired
1st Cir. Retired
E.D.N.Y. Returned to Private Practice
D. Del. Retired
E.D. Okla. Other Employment
D.D.C. Returned to Private Practice
1st Cir. Retired
E.D. Mo. Retired







1923 Peck, John W.
RESIGNATIONS AND REMOVALS
































































Returned to Private Practice
Appointment to Other Office
Returned to Private Practice
Returned to Private Practice
Sought Elected Office-Defeated
Returned to Private Practice
Returned to Private Practice















Returned to Private Practice
Appointment to Other Office
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Appointment to Other Office
Elected Office
Returned to Private Practice
Appointment to Other Office
Military Service
Appointment to Other Office
Appointment to Other Office
Allegations of Misbehavior






























Appointment to Other Office
Appointment to Other Office
Disability
Age/Health














































1970 Carswell, George H.




1974 Middlebrooks, David L.
1974 Smith, Sidney 0.
1974 Travia, Anthony J.
1975 Tyler, Harold R.
1976 Bell, Griffin B.
1976 Comiskey, James A.
1976 Scalera, Ralph F.
1977 McCree, Wade H.
1978 Fogel, Herbert A.
1978 Frankel, Marvin E.
1978 Morris, Joseph W.
1978 Webster, William H.
1979 Cowan, Finis E.
1979 Hufstedler, Shirley M.













5th Cir. Sought Elected Office-Defeated
6th Cir. Returned to Private Practice
E.D. Pa. Inadequate Salary
S.D.N.Y. Inadequate Salary
7th Cir. Allegations of Misbehavior
N.D. Fla. Dissatisfaction with Office
N.D. Ga. Inadequate Salary
E.D.N.Y. Dissatisfaction with Office
S.D.N.Y. Appointment to Other Office
5th Cir. Dissatisfaction with Office
E.D. La. Other Employment
W.D. Pa. Returned to Private Practice
6th Cir. Appointment to Other Office
E.D. Pa. Allegations of Misbehavior
S.D.N.Y. Dissatisfaction with Office
E.D. Okla. Other Employment
8th Cir. Appointment to Other Office
S.D. Tex. Returned to Private Practice
9th Cir. Appointment to Other Office
1993] 417
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Year Name Court Reason for Resignation
1980-1989
1980 Mitchell, George J.
1980 Renfrew, Charles B.
1980 Tone, Phillip W.
1981 Crowley, John P.
1981 Hermansdorfer, Howard
1981 Mulligan, William H.
1982 Jones, Shirley B.
1982 McFadden, Frank H.
1983 Boyle, PatriciaJ.
1983 Higby, Lynn C.
1983 Meanor, H. Curtis
1984 Lucas, Malcolm M.
1984 O'Conor, Robert
1984 Shannon, Fred




1986 Miller, James R.
1986 Sneeden, Emory M.
1987 Getzendanner, Susan
1987 Sessions, William S.
1987 Stern, HerbertJ.
1988 Bork, Robert H.
1988 McDonald, Gabrielle K.
1989 Hastings, Alcee L.
1989 McQuade, Richard B.
1989 Nixon, Walter L.
D. Me. Appointment to Other Office
N.D. Cal. Appointment to Other Office
7th Cir. Dissatisfaction with Office
N.D. Ill. Returned to Private Practice
E.D. Ky. Returned to Private Practice
2d Cir. Inadequate Sala-y
D. Md. Returned to Private Life
N.D. Ala. Inadequate Salary
E.D. Mich.Appointment to Other Office
N.D. Fla. Inadequate Salary
D.N.J. Returned to Private Practice
C.D. Cal. Appointment to Other Office
S.D. Tex. Returned to Private Practice
W.D. Tex. Returned to Private Practice
S.D. Ohio Returned to Private Practice
M.D. Fla. Returned to Private Practice
S.D.N.Y. Appointment to Other Office
D. Nev. Impeachment & Conviction
D. Md. Age/Health
4th Cir. Inadequate Salary
N.D. ill. Returned to Private Practice
W.D. Tex. Appointment to Other Office
D.N.J. Returned to Private Practice
D.C. Cir. Dissatisfaction with Office
S.D. Tex. Dissatisfaction with Office
S.D. Fla. Impeachment & Conviction
N.D. Ohio Other Employment
S.D. Miss. Impeachment & Conviction
RESIGNATIONS AND REMOVALS
Year Name Court Reason for Resignation
1989 Ramirez, Raul A. E.D. Cal. Inadequate Salary
1989 Starr, Kenneth W. D.C. Cir. Appointment to Other Office
1990-Present
1990 Bonner, Robert C.
1990 Irving, J. Lawrence
1990 Scott, Thomas E.








Appointment to Other Office
Dissatisfaction with Office
Returned to Private Practice
Inadequate Salary
Dissatisfaction with Office
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TABLE 2
Judges Listed by Reason for Termination
Year Name Court
Age/Health
1793 Johnson, Thomas S. Ct.
1794 Duane, James D.N.Y.
1796 Blair, John S. Ct.
1800 Ellsworth, Oliver S. Ct.
1804 Moore, Alfred S. Ct.
1818 Sewall, David D. Me.
1825 Tucker, St. George D. Va.
1833 McNairy, John D. Tenn.
1835 Duvall, Gabriel S. Ct.
1836 Glenn, Elias D. Md.
1841 Davis, John A. D. Mass.
1842 Paine, Elijah D. Vt.
1862 McAllister, Matthew H. Cal. Cir.
1863 Marvin, William S.D. Fla.
1865 Sprague, Peleg D. Mass.
1866 Ware, Ashur D. Me.
1867 Betts, Samuel R. S.D.N.Y.
1869 Boynton, Thomas J. S.D. Fla.
1869 Bullock, Jonathan R. D.R.I.
1869 Wilkins, Ross D. Mich.
1870 Casey, Joseph Ct. Cl.
1870 Grier, Robert C. S. Ct.
1870 Watrous, John C. D. Tex.
1877 Smalley, David A. D. Vt.
1883 Morrill, Amos E.D. Tex.


















1819 Tallmadge, Matthias B.
1859 Irwin, Thomas
1873 Sherman, Charles T.
1874 Busteed, Richard
18.74 Durrell, Edward H.
1875 Story, William
1911 Grosscup, Peter S.
1912 Hanford, Cornelius H.
1914 Wright, Daniel T.
1915 Marshall, John A.
1922 Landis, Kenesaw M.
1929 Winslow, Francis A.
1938 Buffington, Joseph
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Year Name Court
1939 Thomas, Edwin S. D. Conn.
1945 Johnson, Albert W. M.D. Pa.
1969 Fortas, Abe S. Ct.
1974 Kerner, Otto 7th Cir.
1978 Fogel, Herbert A. E.D. Pa.




1844 Mason, John Y.
1852 Conkling, Alfred
1870 Fisher, George P.
1881 Davis, John C.B.
1881 Hunt, William H.
1883 Gresham, Walter Q.
1892 Blodgett, Henry
1893 Gresham, Walter Q.
1900 Taft, William H.
1929 Bodine, Joseph L.
1930 Thacher, Thomas D.
1936 Rippey, Harlan W.
1940 Biddle, Francis
1940 Patterson, Robert
1942 Byrnes, James F.
1943 Vinson, Fred M.
1944 Jones, Charles A.
1945 Schwellenbach, Lewi
1952 McGranery, James P.

















































1857 Curtis, Benjamin R.
1864 Hughes, James
1875 Howe, James H.
1911 Rasch, Carl L.








































































































































1936 Ritter, Halsted L. S.D. Fla.
1986 Claiborne, Harry D. Nev.
1989 Hastings, Alcee L. S.D. Fla.
1989 Nixon, Walter L. S.D. Miss.
Impeached-Not Convicted
1873 Delahay, Mark W. D. Kan.
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Year Name Court
Loyalty to the Confederacy
1860 Magrath, Andrew G. D.S.C.
1861 Biggs, Asa D.N.C.
1861 Boyce, Henry W.D. La.
1861 Brockenbrough, John W. W.D. Va.
1861 Campbell, John A. S. Ct.
1861 Gholson, SamuelJ. D. Miss.
1861 Halyburton, James D. E.D. Va.
1861 Jones, William G. D. Ala.
1861 McCaleb, Theodore H. D. La.
1861 McIntosh, McQueen N.D. Fla.
1861 Monroe, Thomas B. D. Ky.
1861 Nicoll, John C. D. Ga.
1861 Ringo, Daniel D. Ark.
1861 Scarburgh, George P. Ct. Cl.
1865 Dick, Robert P. D.N.C.
Military Service
1942 Clark, William 3d Cir.
Other Employment
1824 Bland, Theodric D. Md.
1826 Tait, Charles D. Ala.
1883 Davis, John C.B. Ct. Cl.
1888 Dyer, Charles E. E.D. Wis.
1908 Ewing, Nathaniel W.D. Pa.
1918 Campbell, Ralph E.D. Okla.
1919 Batts, Robert L. 5th Cir.
1961 Savage, Royce H. N.D. Okla.
1967 Lane, Arthur S. D.NJ.
RESIGNATIONS AND REMOVALS
Year Name Court
1976 Comiskey, James A. E.D. La.
1978 Morris, Joseph W. E.D. Okla.
1989 McQuade, Richard B. N.D. Ohio
Relinquished Court to Brother
1841 Dickerson, Mahlon D.N.J.
Retired
Hall, Willard D. Del.
Leavitt, Humphrey H. D. Ohio
Nelson, Samuel S. Ct.
Loring, Edward G. Ct. Cl.
Peck, Ebenezer Ct. Cl.
Olin, Abram B. D.D.C.
Strong, William S. Ct.
Knowles, John P. D.R.I.
Hunt, Ward S. Ct.
Erskine, John D. Ga.
Drummond, Thomas 7th Cir.
Drake, Charles D. Ct. Cl.
Wylie, Andrew D.D.C.
Bryan, George S. D.S.C.
MacArthur, Arthur D.D.C.
Treat, Samuel E.D. Mo.
Hill, Robert A. D. Miss.
McKennan, William 3d Cir.
Scofield, Glenni W. Ct. Cl.
Benedict, Charles L. E.D.N.Y.
Field, Stephen J. S. Ct.
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Year Name Court
1899 Butler, William E.D. Pa.
1899 Cox, Walter S. D.D.C.
1902 Shipman, Nathaniel 2d Cir.
1902 Webb, Nathan D. Me.
1903 Caldwell, Henry C. 8th Cir.
1903 Hagner, Alexander B. D.D.C.
1903 Shiras, George S. Ct.
1903 Shiras, Oliver P. N.D. Iowa
1904 Alvey, Richard H. D.C. Cir.
1905 Bunn, Romanzo W.D. Wis.
1905 Jackson, John J. W.D. Va.
1905 Jenkins, James G. 7th Cir.
1905 Morris, Martin F. D.C. Cir.
1905 Nott, Charles C. Ct. Cl.
1906 Brown, Henry B. S. Ct.
1906 Hallett, Moses D. Colo.
1906 Hawley, Thomas P. D. Nev.
1906 Wheeler, Hoyt H. D. Vt.
1907 Wallace, William J. N.D.N.Y.
1908 Lochren, William D. Minn.
1909 Dallas, George M. 3d Cir.
1911 Brawley, William H. D.S.C.
1912 Locke, James W. S.D. Fla.
1913 Peelle, StantonJ. Ct. Cl.
1914 Holt, George C. S.D.N.Y.
1915 Howry, Charles B. Ct. Cl.
1916 Atkinson, George W. Ct. Cl.
1917 Coxe, Alfred C. 2d Cir.
1917 Putnam, William L. 1st Cir.
1918 Bradford, Edward G. D. Del.
RESIGNATIONS AND REMOVALS
Year Name Court
1918 Dodge, Frederic 1st Cir.
1918 Dyer, David P. E.D. Mo.
1925 McKenna, Joseph S. Ct.
1948 Kampf, Edward S. N.D.N.Y.





1892 Montgomery, Martin V.
1892 Reed, James Hay
1895 Priest, Henry S.
1904 Wing, Francis J.
1906 Duell, Charles H.
1912 Angell, Alexis C.
1912 Donworth, George
1917 Veeder, Van Vetchen
1918 Covington, James H.
1920 Haight, Thomas G.
1922 De Vries, M.
1923 Peck, John W.
1927 Hoehling, Adolph A.
1929 Henning, Edward J.
1930 Morris, Hugh M.
1931 Denison, Arthur
1933 Carpenter, George A.
1935 Dawson, Charles I.
1935 Letts, Ira L.
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Name
1970
1976
1979
1981
1981
1982
1983
1984
1984
1985
1985
1987
1987
1990
Sought Elected
1916
1925
1934
1952
1963
1970
Office-Defeated
Hughes, Charles E.
Bledsoe, Benjamin F.
Bourquin, George M.
Bard, Guy K.
Preyer, Lunsford R.
Carswell, George H.
Court
Combs, Bertram T.
Scalera, Ralph F.
Cowan, Finis E.
Crowley, John P.
Hermansdorfer, Howard D.
Jones, Shirley B.
Meanor, H. Curtis
O'Conor, Robert
Shannon, Fred
Duncan, Robert M.
Reed, John A.
Getzendanner, Susan
Stern, Herbert J.
Scott, Thomas E.
6th Cir.
W.D. Pa.
S.D. Tex.
N.D. Ill.
E.D. Ky.
D. Md.
D.NJ.
S.D. Tex.
W.D. Tex.
S.D. Ohio
M.D. Fla.
N.D. Ill.
D.N.J.
S.D. Fla.
S. Ct.
S.D. Cal.
D. Mont.
E.D. Pa.
M.D.N.C.
5th Cir.
